Three Essays in Behavioral Economics by Saunders, Daniel Kaiser
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w90g1r8
Author
Saunders, Daniel Kaiser
Publication Date
2014
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics
A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
by
Daniel Kaiser Saunders
Committee in Charge:
Professor Zachary J. Grossman, Chair
Professor Gary B. Charness
Professor Theodore C. Bergstrom
December 2014
The Dissertation of
Daniel Kaiser Saunders is approved:
Professor Gary B. Charness
Professor Theodore C. Bergstrom
Professor Zachary J. Grossman, Committee Chairperson
September 2014
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics
Copyright c© 2014
by
Daniel Kaiser Saunders
iii
To Kelly, for always supporting me,
and to my father, for showing me the way.
iv
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Zack Grossman, for his encouragement,
guidance and mentoring over the years. I would also like to thank my committee
members, Gary Charness and Ted Bergstrom, for reading the many drafts of my
papers and providing insightful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to my
colleague, John Hartman, for sharing his experimental data for this project.
I would especially like to thank Ted Turocy, who generously shared his time
and his Python code for tracing the Quantal Reponse Equilibria. Truly, this
would not have been possible without his many years of yeoman’s work on this
topic. Last but not least, I would like to thank my gracious co-author, Ayana E.
Johnson, for the opportunity to work on a collaborative publication.
v
Curriculum Vitæ
Daniel Kaiser Saunders
Contact
Email: saunders@econ.ucsb.edu
Website: http://econdan.com
Education
2014 (Expected) PhD in Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara.
2009 Master of Arts in Economics, University of California, Santa Bar-
bara.
2007 Bachelor of Arts in Economics, Mathematics, and Spanish, Uni-
versity of Kansas.
Research Interests
Behavioral and experimental economics, environmental and nat-
ural resource economics
vi
Experience
2013 – 2014 Lecturer at the Martin V. Smith School of Business, California
State University, Channel Islands
2007 – 2013 Teaching assistant for undergraduate and graduate Courses, Uni-
versity of California, Santa Barbara
2005 – 2007 Instructor for college algebra in the Kansas Algebra Program,
University of Kansas
2010 Research Assistant for Zachary Grossman, University of Califor-
nia, Santa Barbara
Working Papers
D.K. Saunders Errors and altruism in threshold public good.
2014
D.K. Saunders The trouble with trembles: Reverberating noise
in the market entry game. 2014
Publications
A.E. Johnson and D.K. Saunders Time preferences and the
management of coral reef fishers.. Ecological Economics; April
2014, Vol. 100, pp. 130-139.
vii
Awards and Honors
Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award. UCSB 2012
Nominee for GSA Excellence in Teaching Award. UCSB
2013
Conference Participation
May 2014 Bay Area Behavioral/Experimental Economics Workshop, Stan-
ford CA
October 2013 North-American ESA Conference, Santa Cruz CA
November 2012 North-American ESA Conference, Tucson AZ
viii
Abstract
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics
Daniel Kaiser Saunders
This dissertation concerns two key topics in behavioral economics: bounded
rationality and hyperbolic time preferences. While these two topics do not have
much in common, per se, the analyses presented here do contain unifying themes.
Each chapter focuses on issues pertaining to public economics. The environments
are often characterized by strategic interaction, in that each individual’s choices
affects the welfare of others. In such cases, economic efficiency is by no means
guaranteed.
The first two chapters examine environments with multiple Nash equilibria,
which limits predictions. I utilize Quantal Response Equilibrium, which relaxes
the assumption of pure best-response in favor of noisy best response. This allows
me to make comparative static predictions across group-size, information com-
pleteness, payoff-type, and state of the world; predictions that are problematic
under pure best-response. I conduct laboratory experiments for the threshold
game (chapter one) and the market entry game (chapter two). I find that much of
the seemingly anomalous behavior observed in the data is easily explained using
QRE. This suggests that quantal response is a useful alternative assumption to
ix
best-response in coordination problems, and, in particular, logit QRE is a valuable
equilibrium model of coordination failure with simple economic intuition.
The third chapter advances a simple β − δ model of quasi-hyperbolic time
preferences. In this chapter, the theoretical model is used to construct the key
variables from our data. This data was collected in the field by my co-author,
when she visited the islands of Bonaire and Curac¸ao in 2010. While much of the
data is survey response or demographic related, the last part of each interview
includes a paid experiment to elicit time preferences over various time horizons.
We find that, controlling for key demographic factors, decreased patience (lower δ)
and present bias (β < 1) are associated with an lower willingness to adopt marine
reserve restrictions, but they have no effect on attitudes about gear restrictions.
Professor Zachary J. Grossman
Dissertation Committee Chair
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Introduction
Behavioral models serve a useful role as a complement to standard economic
models. There are important contexts in which a behavioral model or insight pro-
vides the greatest predictive power. This dissertation explores three such contexts:
the case of a threshold public good, the problem of market entry (a congestible
public good), and the case managing an exhaustible natural resource. Public
goods problems are just one example of situations involving strategic interaction,
where individual best response behavior does not guarantee overall economic effi-
ciency. This supports the case for policy interventions aimed at increasing welfare.
Such policies require a correct diagnosis of the underlying failure, for which I turn
to behavioral models.
Chapter 1 focuses on the threshold public goods game, in which individuals
simultaneously choose a level of pledged contributions to a unitary public good.
If total pledges exactly meet an exogenous threshold that is common knowledge,
then all pledges are binding and the public good is produced. I conduct a two-
1
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by-two experiment varying group-size and information regarding the state of the
world. Small groups have four members, while large groups have eight. Players are
endowed with one of two possible values to the public good, drawn independently
each round with equal probability. Under complete information, subjects knew
the entire state of the world, while under incomplete information each player has
private knowledge of her own type, and she knows the binomial distribution from
which others’ types are drawn.
It is hard to make predictions across these treatments using Nash or Bayes-
Nash equilibrium concepts since there are typically infinitely many equilibria in
this game. I elect to use logit quantal response equilibrium, which provides a
straightforward method for making predictions across these treatments. The
model under-predicts average contributions and the frequency with which the
threshold is met, called the provision rate; although it does a better job predict-
ing changes in these variables across treatments.
One potential improvement to this research would be to incorporate a struc-
tural estimate of social preferences. Given the stochastic nature of QRE, a like-
lihood function may be constructed to estimate the degree of decision error and
altruism, simultaneously. This would likely remove the biased under-predictions.
This would also help place the paper with in the public goods literature, where
other-regarding preferences play a crucial role. As is, logit equilibrium has con-
2
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siderable statistical power; supporting notion of quantal response behavior in the
face of coordination problems.
Chapter 2 examines the market entry game. The environment is defined as
follows: players choose between a risk-less “outside” option, where payoffs are
fixed, and a risky “inside” option, where payoffs are decreasing in the total number
of players who choose in, and there is some level of total entry at which payoffs fall
below the outside option. This closely resembles the classic market entry problem
with a finite capacity for profitable firms. Notice that the market, itself, is a
congestible good. Another way to conceive of this game is as a binary analogue
to the tragedy of the commons, and one commonly studied application is the
classic highway congestion problem. Simply define the outside option as a lengthy
beltway with no traffic and the inside option as a short bridge with travel times
are increasing in the total number of travelers.
This chapter offers new analysis of data from a previous experiment by my
colleague John Hartman, as well as an experiment of my own. Combining our
data sets allows us to control for several experimental design choices and interpre-
tations. Treatments include manipulating payoffs through either a toll or through
affine re-scaling. I also study the effects of group-size and information complete-
ness. I find that the QRE is able to capture key features of the data, and I
demonstrate the econometric value-added by this approach by showing that the
3
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logit QRE is able to predict a difference-in-difference effect across payoff-type and
group-size that a standard logit regression will miss. This is because of the dual-
causality problem implied by quantal choice in a strategic setting. Specifically, I
learn that a model in which the reverberation of noise across individuals is fully
accounted requires fewer degrees of freedom and privates greater statistical power
than a model that assumes each player ignores the noise of others.
Chapter 3 presents my work with Ayana E. Johnson. We study the con-
servation attitudes of fishers and divers on the islands of Bonaire and Curac¸ao.
These two professions represent the bulk of industry on these islands, and each
one relies heavily upon the local coral reef fisheries. A paid field experiment was
conducted in order to elicit revealed discount rates in a three period framework.
Payments in the present period were distributed with a front-end delay to fully
separate risk and time preferences. We motivate our analysis with a simple β − δ
model, which amounts to measuring the changes in measured discount rates be-
tween the first two periods and the last two period. We are able to identify the
individual discount rates and present bias in the data. Controlling for a host of
demographic controls, we find that decreased patience (lower δ) or present bias
(β < 1) reduces willingness to use marine reserves, but has no effect on preference
for gear restrictions. This makes a great deal of sense since marine reserves rep-
4
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resent inter-temporal conservation, while gear restrictions are design to mitigate
a contemporaneous externality generated by fishers.
All of these works utilize theoretical models to motivate an empirical analysis
using experimental data. Each chapter considers a coordination failure regarding
a different public choice problem. In each example, standard economic models
provide a useful basis for studying the problem. However, the addition of be-
havioral assumptions prove useful in increasing statistical power and predicting
so-called anomalies in individual decision-making.
5
Chapter 1
Explaining pledges to threshold
public goods with logit
equilibrium
1.1 Introduction
Many fundraisers make use of a provision point: a predetermined threshold
that total pledged contributions must exceed in order to produce a good. No-
table examples include unitary public goods, such as a bridge or park, or low-
marginal-cost information goods, such as those listed on www.kickstarter.com
or www.indiegogo.com. These online implementations operate on a unique scale
6
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compared to previous methods, both in the number of contributors and the value
of contributions. More than 2,241,475 people pledged to at least one Kickstarter
project in 2012, generating $319, 786, 629 in total pledges. This lead to 18,109
successfully funded projects. At least 17 separate projects raised in excess of one
million dollars each. Yet, some 56% of all projects were not successfully funded.1
To what extent the success rate of funding reflects the provision rate of economi-
cally efficient projects remains an open question.
As online threshold mechanisms continue to grow, it is increasingly important
to understand the unique challenges that they present. There are two key fea-
tures that distinguish these online technologies from other fundraising methods:
(i) uncommonly large groups and (ii) little information regarding other contribu-
tors’ incentives. Conventional thinking suggests that increased payoff uncertainty
will reduce provision. Likewise, it seems intuitive that larger groups will have a
more difficult time reaching the threshold.2 Yet, it is not clear how these forces
will interact in practice. Assuming total pledges are near the threshold, upward
trembles in pledging will increase the likelihood of success, while downward trem-
bles will reduce the odds. Therefore, individual noisiness can have a substantial
1All estimates are taken from the Kickstarter website.
2This assumes the threshold is scaled in proportion to total benefits, so that the relative
difficulty of the coordination problem is maintained.
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effect on overall welfare, driven by the discontinuity of everyone’s payoffs at the
threshold.
Such strong strategic interaction means that the cost of even a small degree
of coordination failure may be substantial. There are actually two coordination
problems underlying this game. First, there is a standard coordination problem3
between the dominated equilibria with under-contribution and the efficient equi-
libria with total contributions equal to the threshold. The latter set of equilibria
satisfy the undominated, trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium refinement (Bagnoli
and Lipman, 1989). Second, there remains a conflicting-interest coordination
problem among these efficient equilibria, similar to a game of chicken (Kagel and
Roth, 1997).4 Many combinations of contributions are capable of achieving the
threshold; each one implying a different distribution of net benefits to the players.
The tension of the game lies between each player’s incentive to pledge as little as
possible, while still meeting the threshold as a group.
3In the pure coordination game, there are two equilibria, one of which is both Pareto efficient
and Pareto improving. This is the simplest coordination problem, since both players have the
same preferences over equilibrium selection.
4In the game of chicken, there are two equilibria, and each player prefers a different equilib-
rium. Interestingly, each equilibrium involves players taking opposite actions. Hence, players’
decisions are strategic substitutes, and this is an anti-coordination game. In the threshold game,
players’ pledges are strategic complements below the threshold, but they are strategic substitutes
at the threshold.
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In their experiment, Bagnoli and McKee (1991) observe that larger groups
converge to equilibrium slower than smaller groups under complete information.5
While this finding is consistent with the intuition that coordination difficulty
increases as group-size grows, standard equilibrium notions are silent about this
process. Likewise, Marks and Croson (1999) study the role of payoff uncertainty6
using provision points, but they find no significant effects on average contributions
or the provision rate. By contrast, I use the set of symmetric, pure-strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibria with private information to demonstrate how incomplete
information might reduce provision; although, the problem of multiple equilibria
prevents crisp predictions here too.
These empirical findings across group-size and information treatments may be
consistent with the many equilibria under best-response, but the usefulness of that
approach is limited by its inability to make precise predictions. I use logit quantal
response equilibrium as an alternate explanation for these effects, and I motivate
5Bagnoli and McKee (1991) find slower convergence to equilibrium play for large groups.
In addition, Goeree et al. (2005a) study the Volunteer’s Dilemma, a parameterization of the
provision point in which one player can unilaterally produce the public good. They derive
and reject a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium explanation of group size effects under complete
information, and suggest noisy best response and inequity aversion as alternative explanations.
6The authors provide each player with private information regarding her valuation of the
public good, but they provide no information, whatsoever, regarding others’ valuations. Subjects
were able to partially observe outcomes between experimental rounds, so it is possible that they
could update upon prior beliefs regarding others’ payoff types. However, the paper makes no
attempt to model this process.
9
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this approach with the dynamic process of noisy directional learning developed
by Anderson et al. (2004).
While existing experiments document some of these treatment effects, they
lack the unified design required for making clean comparisons across treatments.
I conduct a new two-by-two experiment that varies group-size and payoff uncer-
tainty, in order to examine these issues with greater clarity. Unlike Bagnoli and
McKee (1991), the threshold is scaled in proportion to the number of players so as
to preserve the difficulty of the coordination problem. It would be prohibitively
expensive to conduct a paid experiment on the scale of online mechanisms, so
I examine the more modest comparative static as group-size grows from four to
eight players. For simplicity, payoff heterogeneity takes the simple form of a
Bernoulli random variable, with high and low payoffs, implying a binomial distri-
bution for the state of nature. Under the complete information treatment, each
subject knows the full state of the world, while under the incomplete information
treatment, she only knows her own payoff-type and the distribution from which
others’ types are drawn. This definition of payoff uncertainty contrasts sharply
with Marks and Croson (1999), who offer subjects no information about others’
payoff types, and the Bayesian game framework allows for theoretical tractability
with both equilibrium concepts.
10
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I find that increased group-size reduces the provision rate and expected total
pledges (relative to the threshold) under complete information, but it has no ef-
fect under incomplete information. Interestingly, increased information increases
average total pledges for small groups, but not for large groups, and increased
group-size reduces the variance of total pledges, but only under complete infor-
mation. At the individual level, I find that increased information increases the
average contribution of high types in small groups, while it lowers the average
contribution of low types in large groups. Lastly, increased group-size reduces
the average contribution of high types under complete information. Logit QRE
correctly predicts the sign of each of these results; comparative statics that were
not readily available under pure best-response.
While the QRE model has substantial success accounting for comparative stat-
ics across treatments, it does not perform well when predicting levels within treat-
ments. The model systematically under-predicts average contributions and the
provision rate. Being a public goods game, it is natural to consider behavioral
preferences for altruism or fairness, which would naturally increase the level of
contributions. However, such models are of limited use with strict best-response,
as they can rationalize many combinations of contributions at or above the thresh-
old, including instances where some individuals contribute more than their values.
Moreover, I find that total contributions exactly equaled the threshold only about
11
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4% of the time, while they over-shot and under-shot the threshold at rate of 54%
and 42% respectively. Exact hits to the efficient Nash equilibria are rare; though,
there is a distinct bias above the threshold. The former is consistent with deci-
sion error while the latter with altruism. Thus, a model that incorporates both
features may ultimately prove best.
Strong assumptions such as strict best response are useful in pursuit of sim-
ple intuition and mathematical tractability. Relaxing such assumptions is equally
useful when it serves that same purpose, and I will show that the threshold game
is one such instance. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
1.2 defines the threshold game and presents the predictions of various equilibrium
concepts. Section 1.3 describes the experimental design, the data, and the estima-
tion results for the model. Section 1.4 discusses the consequences of incorporating
social preferences. Section 1.5 concludes with remarks for future research.
1.2 Equilibria in the Threshold Game
In this section I will present a description of the threshold game along with
some background on research in this area. I will review the predictions of Nash
under complete information, I will present some results for the symmetric, Bayes-
Nash equilibria under incomplete information, and I will motivate and define the
logit quantal response equilibria.
12
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The threshold game represents a public choice regarding the production of
a unitary public good with a known, exogenous minimum fundraising threshold.
Each player has a fixed endowment of the private good with which to make pledges
to the public good, and each player receives some private benefit if the public
good is produced. Players simultaneously choose pledges. If total pledges fall
short of the threshold, all pledges are refunded. If pledges equal the threshold,
they are binding, and each players receives her benefit minus her pledge. If total
contributions exceed the threshold, the public good is produced, and all excess
contributions are refunded in proportion to pledges.
Early experiments on the provision point mechanism date back to Marwell
and Ames (1980), who included a provision point treatment in their series of
experiments documenting the absence of free-rider behavior in the laboratory.
Subsequent research examined how different parameterizations of the threshold
or individual benefits might affect behavior. Croson and Marks (2000) identified
the step return (SR), the ratio of total benefit to the threshold (total cost), as
analogous to the marginal per capita return in controlling for group-size effects.
The MPCR was identified by Isaac and Walker (1988) to explain residual group-
size effects in experiments with linear public goods. As it happens, the MPCR and
the SR coincide at the threshold because the average marginal return per player
13
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
must equal the overall group return.7 Therefore, the threshold must be adjusted
in proportion to average total benefit order to isolate pure group-size effects.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) established the equilibrium refinement necessary
and sufficient for efficient outcomes in the provision point mechanism; both for a
unitary and a multi-unit public good. Specifically, they observed that the undom-
inated, trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibrium refinement coincides with the
subset of efficient equilibria at the threshold in the unitary case. In a follow-up
study by Bagnoli and McKee (1991), the authors find support for this refinement,
while Bagnoli et al. (1992) find strong evidence rejecting a similar refinement for
the multiple-unit case. The authors also choose to use proportional refunds. This
simplifies the notion of economic efficiency to the provision rate, i.e. the probabil-
ity of meeting or exceeding the threshold, while avoiding any perverse incentives
for over-pledging.8
Little is understood about the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria under incomplete
information. This is due, in part, to the mathematical intractability of pure
best-response in this highly discontinuous environment. In the next subsection, I
7Below the threshold, the marginal per capita return is zero, while above the threshold it
is negative. At some infinitesimal ε > 0 short of the threshold, the marginal contribution will
be pivotal, and the gross return to the group as a whole is fixed at
∑
i vi/T . While individuals
will have heterogeneous private returns, the average (per capita) return must equal the group
return since total costs and benefits are fixed.
8This is not meant to imply that rebates have no effect on choices. Marks and Croson
(1998) find that rebates affect the variance of contributions. As QRE makes predictions about
the entire distribution of contributions, it may explain these refund effects.
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will preview the parameterization of the game used for the experiment in order
to numerically solve for the set of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria. For this
parameterization, aggregate contributions must equal to the threshold in some
state of nature, in equilibrium; leading to average provision rates between zero
and one. However, this solution concept again yields infinitely many equilibria.
By contrast, I demonstrate that logit equilibrium has the potential to account for
noisy decision-making, generate predictions across all experimental treatments
and variables, and explain any systemic patterns observed at the individual and
group level.
1.2.1 Nash and Bayes-Nash Equilibria
Now I will review the set of Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria. While these
equilibria may vary across treatments, there are some unifying features. First,
both concepts admit infinitely many equilibria, making it is difficult to predict
outcomes. Additionally, the probability that contributions meet or exceed the
threshold, called the provision rate, depends upon the equilibrium selected. There
are two sets of equilibria under complete information: an efficient set where total
contributions perfectly match the threshold with probability one, and a set of
dominated equilibria where the probability of reaching the threshold is zero. The
various provision rates predicted by the Nash equilibria in the Bayesian game with
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private information lie in between these two extremes. There are multiple sets
of equilibria, and each equals the threshold with probability one in some state
of nature, yielding average provision rates between zero and one across states.
This approach cannot make more specific predictions without assuming away the
coordination problem that real players typically fail to resolve.
The structure of the model is as follows. There are n players, indexed as
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Each player has a potential private benefit, vi, for a unitary public
good. Payoff functions are defined over pledged contributions ci ∈ [0, wi] where wi
is player i’s endowment. If total pledges fall short of an exogenous and commonly
known threshold, T , then the public good is not produced and all pledges are
refunded. If the threshold is surpassed, then the public good is produced and
total excess contributions are refunded in proportion to each player’s share of
total pledges. I express this in strategic notation below, with payoffs normalized
to net gains for simplicity.
ui(ci, c−i) =

vi − T
(
ci
ci+c−i
)
if ci + c−i ≥ T
0 if ci + c−i < T
where c−i =
∑
j 6=i
cj (1.1)
I assume
∑
i vi ≥ T throughout, as the alternative case is of little interest. A
strategy profile achieves the threshold,
∑
i ci = T , if-and-only-if it is an undomi-
nated, trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibrium (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989). For
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most parameterizations, a continuum of equilibria survive this refinement, and
each equilibrium affords a different distribution of net benefits to players. There
remains a conflicting-interest coordination problem among these efficient equilib-
ria, which provides a continually destabilizing force against perfect coordination,
as some players will always have an incentive to nudge the vector of contributions
away from its current allocation. There also exists a set of dominated equilib-
ria where the threshold is never achieved. In fact, total contributions are so low
that no individual can deviate to a higher pledge and meet the threshold in an
individually rational way.
Less is understood about the Bayes-Nash equilibria under private information,
where each player, i, has private knowledge of vi but only know the distribution
of v−i. The symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria are a sensible starting point for this
analysis since all players of a given payoff type face an identical decision problem.
In addition, this subset of equilibria is most comparable to the behavioral model
presented in the next section, which also obeys symmetry. I show that every
symmetric, pure-strategy9 Bayes-Nash equilibrium predicts total pledges to meet
the threshold exactly in certain state of nature. Provision occurs in some states
9Looking at the Volunteer’s Dilemma, Weesie (1994) demonstrates a less-is-more predic-
tion, by comparing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria under complete information to pure-strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibria under incomplete information. As stated earlier, Goeree et al. (2005a)
reject the mixed-strategy explanation for group size effects. This is why I focus exclusively on
pure-strategy equilibria.
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and not in others, so average provision rates across states range from zero and
one.
To demonstrate this fact, it is first necessary to specify a parameterization
of the game because the best-responses occur at discontinuities in payoffs that
are non-differentiable. At these points, any infinitesimal reduction in pledges
would strictly reduce the number of states in which the threshold is achieved,
generating a sudden drop in expected payoffs. Payoff heterogeneity is generated
by re-drawing each player’s value, vi, every round as either “high” or “low” with
equal probability. Specifically, the low value is vl = 20 while the high value is
vh = 40. Endowments are equalized to wi = 40, which is helpful for comparison
across states, but means that only a low type may contribute more than her value.
The threshold is set equal to T = nvl in order to fix the average step return (SR)
across group-size. Small groups have n = 4 members while large ones have n = 8.
In this framework, it is weakly efficient to produce the public good across all states
of the world; strictly so if there is at least one high type.
By restricting attention to the set of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria, strategy
profiles simplify to an ordered pair, (c∗l , c
∗
h), representing the type-contingent best
responses of all players. I solve for the set of equilibria through numerically guess-
and-check of every strategy profile in a finely discretized grid of the strategy
space. Additional details regarding the numerical methods use here are found in
18
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Appendix A. In these equilibria, total pledges perfectly match the threshold for
certain states of nature.10 For example, the equilibria that exactly achieve the
threshold in the state with k low types satisfy the equation below.
kcl + (n− k)ch = T (1.2)
However, equilibria do not necessarily exist for every state, k, and only a subset
of the strategy profiles that do satisfy these equations can support an equilibrium.
The estimated equilibria are presented in Table 1.1. All equilibria have an average
provision rate between 0 and 0.6875 for small groups and between 0 and 0.3633
for large groups. Hence, group-size influences the range of potential provision
rates. If the coordination difficulty depends upon the number of players, then the
realized provision rate will vary with group-size in ways that cannot be modeled
using best response behavior.
10Attempts to verify these equilibria lead to systems of high order polynomial inequalities.
Thus, verifying solutions would require a numerical implementation of Newton’s method, which
yields no more insight than the original grid search.
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Table 1.1: Bayes-Nash Equilibria
(a) Groups of 4
Set of Equilibria Ex-ante Provision Rate
cl = 0 and ch = 0 0.00%
cl = 0 and ch = 20 6.25%
cl + 3ch = 80 for 0 < cl < 12.84 31.25%
2cl + 2ch = 80 for 13 ≤ cl ≤ 18.33 68.75%
(b) Groups of 8
Set of Equilibria Ex-ante Provision Rate
cl = 0 and ch = 0 0.00%
cl = 0 and ch = 20 0.39%
cl + 7ch = 160 for 0.4 ≤ cl ≤ 7.4 3.52%
2cl + 6ch = 160 for 0.2 ≤ cl ≤ 11.9 14.45%
3cl + 5ch = 160 for 8.5 ≤ cl ≤ 15.5 36.33%
These results are not meant to be an exhaustive characterization of the range
of Bayesian Nash equilibria. Rather, it simply underscores the fact that (a) the
conflicting-interest coordination problem remains under incomplete information,
(b) the average prevision rate is predicted to be less than one under perfect co-
ordination, and (c) failure to coordinate will determine overall welfare. It is not
possible to make more specific predictions across group-size or information treat-
ments given the indeterminacy of these solution concepts. One might consider
asserting additional restrictions that resolve the equilibrium selection problem,
but what if individuals fail to stably coordinate? I argue in favor of using logit
quantal response equilibrium, an intuitive model of coordination failure, for mak-
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ing meaningful predictions across treatments and variables that were previously
undetermined.
1.2.2 Quantal Response Equilibria
Given the difficulty of maintaining total contributions at the threshold, let
alone attaining this goal in the first place, it is no surprise that experiments typ-
ically find noisy decision-making and frequent coordination failure. Accordingly,
the pure-strategy equilibria that tacitly assume perfect coordination are of lim-
ited use in practice, regardless of whether theoretical solutions to the equilibrium
selection problem can be obtained. It is natural to wonder whether the concept
of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can provide greater insight here.
To begin thinking about this issue, recall that there exists a set of dominated
pure-strategy equilibria. Any mixed-strategy profile that nests all probability mass
inside of this region is a Nash equilibrium too. This includes all manner of exotic
mixing where, for example, a player may evenly distribute probability density
along a compact subset of her choices, while placing the remaining probability
upon a discrete mass point. Clearly, there will be infinitely many such equilibria,
so mixed strategies do not help with the problem of indeterminacy. While other
mixed-strategy equilibria may exist at or near the threshold, it is not clear how
to solve for them. It stands to reason that the threshold would be missed with
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positive probability in some cases, so mixing equilibria may lead to a reduction
in the provision rate relative to pure-strategies. It strains credulity to argue that
players are capable of mixing in such a sophisticated manner as to maintain the
indifference of all other players, but that they are not just as easily capable of
coordinating on a pure-strategy equilibrium at the threshold; especially when
such mixing implies greater coordination failure and lower expected payoffs.
An alternative approach promoted by this research is to use the logit quantal
response equilibrium (QRE) model originally proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995). In this framework, players are no longer assumed capable of perfect best
respond to their incentives. Instead, each player chooses each action in some
proportion to its respective benefit, reflecting the an imperfect attempt at best
response. A degree of decision error permeates everyone’s choices, and these errors
have a weak feedback loop through expected payoffs. QRE accounts for all of this
because it is an equilibrium model, where expected payoffs and quantal responses
are mutually consistent and jointly determined.
To motivate this equilibrium concept, I refer to the dynamic model of noisy
directional learning proposed by Anderson et al. (2004). In this model, players are
observe each other’s choices in continuous time, and they regularly adjust their
decisions over a continuous action space in the direction of increasing expected
payoffs. While each player correctly calculates the directional change necessary
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to increase her expected payoffs, she does not correctly anticipate the magnitude
of the change required to perfectly best respond. Presumably, this is because she
cannot accurately predict the choices of others, which is a sensible assumption
in the context of multiple equilibria. Anderson et al. (2004) specify this decision
error as a Weiner process, which admits a stochastic steady state with a logit
specification. They name this steady state the “logit equilibrium”; although, it is
simply a continuous analogue to logit QRE.11
The authors further demonstrate that this logit equilibrium is locally stable
under noisy directional learning dynamics for every potential game, and that such
stability is global when equilibrium is unique. A potential game is a game for
which there exists a potential function, V (c1, ..., cn), such that ∂ui/∂ci = ∂V/∂ci
for every player i. One sufficient condition for the existence of a potential function
is that payoffs may be written in the following form:
ui(ci, c−i) = u(ci, c−i) + θi(ci) + φi(c−i) (1.3)
Suppose for a moment that excess contributions are not refunded in the threshold
game. If the threshold is achieved, each player’s payoffs are ui = vi− ci, otherwise
they are zero. It is clear that this is a potential game where u(ci, c−i) = φi(c−i) = 0
11McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) only prove the existence of logit QRE for finite games. How-
ever, payoff functions in the threshold obey step-wise continuity; a sufficient condition for exis-
tence of the continuous analogue to logit QRE.
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and θi(ci) = vi − ci. One could just as easily guess the potential function to be
the sum of all payoffs V (c1, ..., cn) =
∑
i(vi − ci) since ∂V/∂ci = ∂ui/∂ci = −1
for any player i. Hence, the principal branch of logit equilibrium exists and is
locally stable under noisy directional learning dynamics in the absence of the
proportional refund. This logic does not translate directly to the case where there
is a refund, which is not a potential game. However, the reasoning underpinning
this stability is simple, intuitive, and applicable to both scenarios. Whenever total
contributions are below the threshold, everyone’s expected payoffs are increasing in
the direction of increased contributions, and vice versa when total pledges exceed
the threshold. The proportional fund only dampens the magnitude individual
costs when the threshold is exceeded, which is unlikely to substantively alter the
forces of attraction responsible for local stability.
In any case, the analysis presented here presumes that such a stochastic steady
state has already been reached. This equilibrium is implicitly defined by the
following two conditions.
i. A set of quantal response functions, {σi}ni=1, that monotonically transform
expected payoffs into probability densities according to the logit rule:
σi(ci) =
exp(λ pii(ci))∫
si
exp(λ pii(si)) dsi
(1.4)
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ii. A set of expected payoff functions, {pii}ni=1, that correctly account for the
noisy behavior of others:
pii(ci) = ui(ci, σ−i) (1.5)
It is clear that QRE is unique for λ = 0, since every player must randomize
uniformly over all actions. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) prove that the uniqueness
of QRE holds for every λ ∈ [0, λ∗], where λ∗ is a constant that is game-specific
and sensitive to parameterization. The authors also prove the existence of a
continuous correspondence of equilibria connecting uniform mixing at λ = 0 to a
generically unique Nash equilibrium as λ→∞, and they call this correspondence
the “principal branch”.12 This is the only subset of logit QRE that have been
applied to data in the literature. The justification for this includes the fact that
(i) it is the only set of equilibria that exists for certain, (ii) it is the only set of
equilibria that exist for λ ∈ [0, λ∗], and (iii) it is the only set of equilibria with
a known method for solving numerically. Thus, the principal branch nests utter
12In symmetric or near-symmetric games with multiple equilibria, such as when players share
a homogeneous value for the public good, the principal branch, itself, may no longer be unique for
λ > λ∗. In such cases, the principal branch intersects other sets of quantal response equilibria,
so it is no longer possible to use QRE to avoid the indeterminacy of multiple Nash equilibria.
Likewise, the selection of a Nash equilibrium as a limiting QRE becomes a meaningless exercise
because the principal branch nests more than one Nash equilibrium in the limit. Fortunately,
such bifurcations occur far away from the typical estimates of λ found with experimental data,
so this theoretical limitation is rarely binding in practice.
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randomization and mutually consistent best response as special cases in a model
of mutual quantal response.
While the logit specification prevents closed-form solutions to the correspon-
dence of fixed points along the principal branch, modern homotopy methods may
be used to numerically solve the system in a step-by-step procedure. I employ a
variant of the algorithm described in Turocy (2005) to numerically approximate
the principal branch of logit QRE under complete information. The Harsanyi
transformation allows me to recast the game of incomplete information as a game
of imperfect information regarding “Nature”. Thus, the relevant solution con-
cept under private information is the extensive-form analogue to QRE, known as
“Agent QRE” (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998).
I solve for these equilibria using the algorithm described in Turocy (2010). This
is perfectly consistent with noisy directional learning, as Anderson et al. (2004)
prove their results for so-called population games. Both of these algorithms are
extensions of the code incorporated into The Gambit Project (McKelvey et al.,
2013); a set of open-source tools for computational game theorists.13. These ex-
tensions are designed to exploit “mean-statistic” games where each players prefer-
ences only depend upon the sum of others’ choices. Exploiting this special feature
makes it computationally feasible to solve games with more than two players.
13Many thanks to Theodore L. Turocy for generously sharing this code
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1.2.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium Predictions
Once the quantal response functions are obtained by numerical methods, it
is possible make predictions about the mean and variance of pledges by low and
high payoff players. It is also possible to construct the distribution of total con-
tributions and make predictions about the mean and variance of this distribu-
tion. Moreover, one can measure the probability mass of pledged contributions
above an individual’s valuation for low types, or the probability mass of total
contributions in excess of the threshold, which predict the over-contribution rate
and the provision rate, respectively.14 Using the parameterization of the thresh-
old game discussed in section 1.2.1, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 plot three points along
the principal branch correspondence across all four experimental treatments for
λ ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}. Figure 1.1 plots the individual quantal response functions by
payoff-type, while Figure 1.2 presents the distribution of total contributions and
the threshold. Notice that the predicted values of all variables of interest, in-
cluding the mean and variance of individual and total contributions, as well as
average over-contribution and provision rates, vary in a non-linear fashion across
all treatments for any given value of λ.
14Note that these predictions are averaged across states, as many of the estimated moments
in the experimental data must be averaged across states as well. For now, these means are
constructed using the binomial probabilities that apply ex-ante. I re-weight these predictions
using the frequencies found in the experiment for the predictions provided in section 1.3.3.
27
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
Figure 1.1: QRE: Individual Contributions
As a stochastic model of choice, the response functions of QRE may be used to
construct a structural maximum likelihood estimator for the precision parameter,
λ. While this value has the same units as payoffs, it does not have an absolute
interpretation. Rather, it is a relative measure of responsiveness to expected pay-
offs, i.e. it is a relative measure of how well incentives predict choices. A note of
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caution is appropriate here: λ is implicitly embedded inside of σ−i, so the preci-
sion parameter is only a relative measure of responsiveness to the endogenously
determined expected payoff functions, pii(·). This is because the logit equilibrium
is a closed model where quantal responses and expected payoffs are simultane-
ously determined. An increase in relative responsiveness may sharpen or dull
incentives, so a rise in λ can potentially increase or decrease the mean or variance
of individual or total pledged contributions. In certain cases, increased payoff
responsiveness can increase the noisiness in decision-making for some individuals.
29
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
Figure 1.2: QRE: Total Contributions
Typically, economic models track the evolution of an endogenous parameter as
a function of exogenously specified shocks. This model works in reverse, by track-
ing the evolution of endogenous shocks as a function of an exogenously varying
parameter. As such, there is little a priori reason to expect the exogenous pa-
rameter to be constant across games or treatments. For example, McKelvey and
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Palfrey (1995) and Rogers et al. (2009) find parameter estimates that vary signif-
icantly across games, while Sheremeta (2011) finds similar differences within four
implementations of simultaneous contests. Allowing additional degrees of free-
dom for each treatment risks the criticism of over-fitting, while fixing one degree
of freedom across treatments risks misspecification error. With no prior reason
to impose the restriction, I allow the logit parameter to vary across treatments;
although, this has been criticized as post-hoc and empirically vacuous (Haile et
al., 2008).
To preempt such doubts or concerns, I will first lay out some properties of
the model found across a range of parameter values. The model makes a host of
directional predictions for values of λ ∈ [0, 0.75].15 These predictions correspond
to some simple economic intuition of decision errors, and they provide the primary
insights of the model; although, the specific magnitudes of such effects ultimately
require estimation.
In response to the criticism from Haile et al. (2008) that QRE lacks empirical
content, Goeree et al. (2005b) define a list of regularity conditions necessary for
QRE to place testable restrictions upon the data: interiority, continuity, respon-
siveness, and monotonicity. All of these are satisfied by the logit specification
15It would be more satisfying to make claims regarding every λ ∈ [0,∞). Unfortunately, the
bifurcations mentioned in section 1.2.2 make numerical calculations difficult when all players
share the same payoff type under complete information. Nonetheless, the interval used here is
sufficiently large as to nest all of the parameter estimates found in the data. I discuss this issue
in greater detail towards the end of this section.
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with independent preference shocks. Indeed, the directional predictions I present
below are genuinely falsifiable restrictions on the data, with only one degree of
freedom required to predict the level of eight separate variables. This reasoning
is similar in spirit to the analysis presented by Goeree et al. (2005b) that yields
testable hypotheses for the matching pennies game imposed by all regular quantal
response equilibria.
Figure 1.3: Group-Level QRE Predictions
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Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the group-level and individual-level predictions, re-
spectively. Note that the group-level variables considered in Figure 1.3 are state-
contingent. Hence, averages must be taken across all states to collapse these
predictions into a single figure, and these averages correspond to the observed mo-
ments in the experimental data where states are rotating round-to-round. Figure
1.3(a) plots the average probability that total contributions reach the threshold,
and Figure 1.3(b) plots the average probability that a low payoff player pledges
more than her value to the public good. Figures 1.3(c) and 1.3(d) plot the aver-
age mean and variance of total contributions normalized by the threshold. This
normalization is useful for making clean comparisons across group-size, where the
threshold and the range of total contributions scale proportionally.
Several clear patterns emerge regarding the relevant treatment effects for any
value of the precision parameter. First, the provision rate and average contribu-
tions decrease when information is reduced or the number of players is increased.
Moreover, the effects of group-size appear to dominate the effects of information.
For low values of λ, information effects are negligible, since players who do not
respond to payoffs must necessarily be ignoring the information contained in their
incentives. As precision increases, payoff uncertainty has a larger impact on out-
comes; though, even large groups with complete information cannot catch up to
small groups with incomplete information for the parameter values presented here.
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Unsurprisingly, the average variance of contributions is decreasing in lambda, im-
plying that increased sensitivity to payoffs is associated with an overall reduction
in noise. This finding is highly pronounced for complete information, though the
dissipation of noise is noticeably slower under incomplete information. Lastly, the
over-contribution rate of low payoff players decreases in tandem with this reduc-
tion in noisiness. Therefore, the over-contribution predicted by QRE represents a
pure decision-error that vanishes as behavior approaches best response.
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Figure 1.4: Individual-Level QRE Predictions
Figure 1.4 presents the findings at the individual level. Figures 1.4(a) and
1.4(c) plot the mean of individuals contributions of low and high payoff players,
respectively, while Figures 1.4(b) and 1.4(d) do the same for the variance of indi-
vidual contributions. While the standard deviation would be a more natural for
interpreting the units of noisiness, I focus attention on the variance for the sake
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of statistical tests. When examining the data, it will be necessary to statistically
detect significant changes in variability, and the sample variance estimator has a
well-known distribution for testing such hypotheses. Each player conditions her
quantal response upon the full state of the world under complete information, so
the mean and variance of individual contributions may vary state-by-state; while
the opposite is true of incomplete information, by definition. The values presented
here take averages of these distributional moments across all states of nature for
this reason.
To begin, notice that average contributions start at twenty for both payoff
types in Figures 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). This is because all players have the same
choice set, [0, 40], and uniform mixing implies a mean right in the center. For
low payoff players, this means an average benefit of zero, so it is no surprise that
their average contributions are decreasing as they become less sloppy in decision-
making. Such a reduction in average contributions would significantly reduce
expected payoffs via a reduced probability of success, if it were not for the fact that
high types increase their contributions to compensate. Thus, I am left with the
weak inequality that the average contribution of high payoff players is at least as
large as that of low types. These changes are greater under complete information
and for smaller groups, though such differences are only minor. Likewise, increased
payoff responsiveness is associated with a reduction in individual noisiness in
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Figures 1.4(b) and 1.4(d), and that these changes are more pronounced for smaller
groups. For low payoff players, this reduction in variance is faster under complete
information, but the difference across information treatments is imperceptible for
high types.
Before proceeding to the experiments, it is important to say something about
the limiting logit equilibria in the threshold game. Recall that there are uncount-
ably many efficient Nash equilibria that meet the threshold, and there are also
uncountably many dominated Nash equilibria that fall well below the threshold. It
is quite possible that there are uncountably many logit quantal response equilibria
for λ > λ∗, and all of these equilibria may even be a part of the principal branch.
These equilibria may connect to the efficient outcomes in the limit, or they may
connect to the dominated outcomes (or both). If the principal branch exclusively
nests the efficient outcomes at the threshold, then we might expect certain prop-
erties of QRE to carry through in the limit. For example, the comparative static
described above that average contributions be greater for high payoff players than
low types may restrict the limiting equilibria to contributions (cl, ch) such that
cl ≤ ch.
On the other hand, all bets are off if the limiting QRE nests the dominated
Nash equilibria, where high and low payoff players will both be weakly indifferent
across all actions below their private valuations. This limits the usefulness of logit
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QRE since the model cannot solve the underlying problem of equilibrium selec-
tion. Indeed, some parameterizations may admit multiple equilibria, regardless of
whether behavior is assumed to follow best response or quantal response. Little
more can be said on the matter, except that these issues of indeterminacy do
not arise in the range of parameter values typically estimated using experimental
data. Moreover, the thesis of this research is that quantal response behavior is a
sensible and useful assumption for modeling coordination failure, so the limiting
properties that lead back to pure best-response are of little interest.
1.3 The Experiment
The data collection took place within the Experimental and Behavioral Eco-
nomics Laboratory at University of California, Santa Barbara. Sessions were run
in the Fall of 2012 using the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Par-
ticipants were randomly selected from a group of undergraduate and graduate
students at the university who have registered interest to participate in social
science experiments.
This experiment follows a two-by-two design, with small versus large groups
and complete versus private information regarding payoffs. There are eight ses-
sions, including two sessions for each treatment to control for session-specific ef-
fects. The public good is described in terms of a monetary prizes to avoid priming
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social norms or altruistic motives common to public goods. Each session includes
thirty rounds of just one treatment: the first ten rounds are for practice, while
the latter twenty are potentially paid rounds. At the end of each session, one of
the potentially paid rounds is chosen at random to determine payments for each
subject. In addition, each participant receives a $5 show-up fee, and an addition
$5 bonus, regardless of whether the threshold is reached. This bonus is used to
penalize over-bidding by low types, and it could only be lost if a participant con-
tributed more than her valuation when the threshold was reached.16 Each session
lasts about an hour, with average total earnings per participant of $15.04.
Group assignments remain static across the practice rounds and paid rounds,
but change between sets of rounds. By fixing groups, participants have an oppor-
tunity to form beliefs regarding each others’ strategies, which is a necessary pre-
requisite to successful coordination. Players are assigned to groups anonymously,
and they are not able to communicate, so as to minimize tacit cooperation during
the experiment or side-payments afterward. Players do observe the level total
contributions17 at the end of each round, as some minimal information is required
for subjects to learn in accordance with the underlying model.18 They are not
16This penalty was not included in the pilot session, creating a perverse incentive for low
payoff players to over-contribute. Unsurprisingly, over-contribution was a major problem in this
session.
17In this game, knowledge of total contributions is all the information required to pursue
pure self-interest.
18The model requires learning about others’ strategies in order for individuals to determine
the direction of adjustment that will increase expected payoffs.
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able to observe the individual actions of other group members, which reduces
the likelihood of using punishment to enforce higher levels of cooperation. This
also suppresses the information required to act on distributional preferences, or
to punish individual behavior that is considered unfair.
Small groups have n = 4 players, while large groups have n = 8 players. Payoff
types are re-drawn independently and with equal probability in each round. Under
complete information, each player knows the exact number of high and low types
in her group each round, while under incomplete information, each player only
knows her own type each round, as well as the ex-ante distribution of others’ types
across rounds. Each player’s endowment is wi = 40, the low value is vl = 20, the
high value is vh = 40, and the threshold is T = nvl. This ensures a constant
average step return across group-size, while also guaranteeing the efficiency of
provision in each state.
1.3.1 Analysis Across Individuals
On an individual level, observations are defined as a player’s pledge in a given
round. Each session of small groups includes four groups of four players, while
each session of large groups includes two groups of eight players. Therefore, each
session has sixteen subjects in total, with each subject playing twenty potentially
paid rounds. Because each treatment receives two sessions, the sample size is
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Ni = 640 per treatment. Unfortunately, one of the sessions for small groups with
incomplete information did not have sufficient attendance for four groups. This
session only had three groups of four players, for twelve subjects total. Therefore,
this treatment had a sample size of only Ni = 560.
Figure 1.5: Histograms: Individual Contributions
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One pronounced feature of the individual data is the clustering of observations
on integers, as can be seen in Figure 1.5. In particular, a majority of observations
occur at multiples of five, suggesting that participants make their decisions as
though they faced a discrete-choice problem. For this reason, estimates using a
fine approximation of the continuous logit QRE may be biased. Fortunately, this
clustering of data is not pronounced at the aggregate level, as can be seen in the
histograms of total contributions presented in Figure 1.6. Two transformations of
the data that may overcome this bias include (1) using a more discrete approx-
imation of the model while sorting the data individual contributions into coarse
histogram bins or (2) using total contributions instead of individual contributions
to construct alternative maximum likelihood estimators.19
19Despite discrete approximation of the strategy space, the choice probabilities are still con-
tinuous. Therefore, key predictions such as the mean of contributions or the provision rate are
hardly sensitive the coarseness of the discrete approximation. Coarseness should not change the
model’s predictions, only the potential estimate of λ.
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Figure 1.6: Histograms: Total Contributions
Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of individuals exhibited some varia-
tion in pledges across rounds, as can be seen in Figure 1.7. Under complete infor-
mation, no players made identical pledges in every round as both types; although,
one player made identical pledges as a high type with large groups. Under private
information, four players made identical pledges as low types for both group-sizes.
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For high types, five players showed no variation in small groups, while only one
player admitted this behavior in large groups. Overall, only two players showed no
variation in pledges across both payoff types, and both of these subjects were in
small groups with incomplete information. Put bluntly, 98.4% of all participants
appeared to be mixing.
Figure 1.7: Mean/SD Individual Contributions
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Obviously, this does not prove that players are imperfect best-responders.
Players may try to play a mixed-strategy equilibrium, or they may best respond to
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are updated across rounds. Nonetheless, variation
in individual choice is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the applicability
of noisy best response models.
1.3.2 Analysis Across Groups
At the group level, an observation is defined as the total contributions in a
given round. To make the data comparable, I scale these totals by the threshold.
With sixteen subjects per session, there are only two groups of eight per session,
and two sessions per treatment. Given twenty potentially paid rounds per treat-
ment, that leaves Ng = 80 group-level observations for each treatment with large
groups. For small groups, the sample size varies by information treatment. Under
complete information, there were four groups of four in each session, leading to
a sample size of Ng = 160, while under incomplete information, one session had
only three groups of four, implying a sample size of Ng = 140. All of these samples
are large enough to detect variations in the distribution of total contributions for
this experiment.
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Indeed, there is substantial variation contributions across rounds, and there
is little evidence of convergence.20 Figure 1.8 graphs total contributions relative
to the threshold, by group, for each treatment. The means and variances are
stationary across rounds, which is consistent with the idea of a stochastic steady
state. The overall differences in variance across treatments (recorded in Table
1.4) are visually apparent as well: specifically, that increased group-size reduces
the variance of total relative contributions, while increasing information has the
opposite effect. However, total contributions should be independent, as well as
identically distributed, in order for QRE to be a useful “as if” model of aggregate
behavior.
20This is not surprising, as payoff types are re-drawn each round. If payoffs were static, then
one might expect convergence to the threshold. However, it would not be possible to simulate
incomplete information without randomized group re-matching.
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Figure 1.8: Total Contributions by Group across Rounds
There is little evidence of persistence in total contributions across rounds.
Table 1.2 presents the estimates of a first-order auto-regressive process in total
relative contributions across each group in each treatment. Of the twenty-seven
groups included in this experiment, only three present serial correlation at the 10%
significance level. Unfortunately, each group experienced only twenty potentially
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paid rounds, so there is hardly enough statistical power behind these results to
be certain. Therefore, I also estimate a model with data pooled across groups.21
Contributions do exhibit persistence across rounds for small groups with complete
information. Notice that group 8 had significant auto-correlation and average
contributions well below the threshold. Restricting the sample to groups 1-7
removes any sign serial correlation, suggesting that the effect is concentrated solely
within group 8. For every other treatment, there appears to be no serial correlation
in total contributions across rounds.
Table 1.2: Serial Correlation in Total Contributions
(a) TCt = ρo + ρ1TCt−1 + εt
Case Value Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 All
Small ρˆ1 −0.211
(0.228)
−0.448∗
(0.233)
−0.140
(0.238)
−0.311
(0.225)
0.039
(0.238)
−0.094
(0.256)
0.271
(0.221)
−0.490∗
(0.244)
0.181∗∗
(0.078)
Comp ρˆ0 104.712
(3.098)
105.386
(2.703)
103.259
(1.897)
99.060
(1.484)
108.537
(4.469)
112.520
(2.951)
122.760
(5.535)
90.008
(1.997)
106.309
(1.664)
Small ρˆ1 −0.106
(0.201)
−0.022
(0.242)
−0.039
(0.272)
0.022
(0.230)
−0.353
(0.219)
0.323
(0.218)
0.138
(0.251)
- 0.131
(0.084)
Inc ρˆ0 99.177
(2.774)
110.395
(2.964)
106.431
(3.850)
105.393
(3.715)
92.524
(1.955)
103.233
(3.549)
88.728
(3.853)
- 100.443
(1.469)
Large ρˆ1 −0.229
(0.250)
−0.173
(0.239)
−0.229
(0.235)
−0.428∗
(0.216)
- - - - 0.056
(0.114)
Comp ρˆ0 99.884
(2.360)
87.047
(2.851)
94.906
(2.633)
105.842
(1.120)
- - - - 96.736
(1.670)
Large ρˆ1 0.048
(0.272)
0.092
(0.242)
−0.064
(0.237)
−0.130
(0.217)
- - - - 0.067
(0.114)
Inc ρˆ0 99.108
(3.075)
95.887
(2.495)
103.134
(1.520)
104.792
(1.851)
- - - - 100.275
(1.235)
Null hypotheses are H0 : ρˆ1 = 0 or ρˆ0 = 100
21In order to combine the data, the last round of one group is followed by the first round
of another group. Clearly, outcomes are independent across groups. Falsely encoding one in
every twenty observations as potentially serially correlated, when they are certainly independent,
introduces a small amount of attenuation bias in the estimates of serial correlation. However,
the increase in sample size from 20 to 80-160 observations profoundly increases the likelihood of
detecting any serial correlation.
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1.3.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium Results
An estimate the logit parameter is required to make predictions with QRE. I
estimate one parameter value per experimental treatment. For incomplete infor-
mation, only two quantal response functions are required to construct the like-
lihood function; one for each payoff-type. The complete information case is a
bit more complex. In the experiment, values are re-drawn every round, so each
round may have a different number of high types and low types, i.e. a different
state of the world. Presumably, players condition their choices on the state of the
world under complete information, so the quantal response functions are state-
dependent. The complete information treatment requires eight (sixteen) separate
quantal response functions in order to construct the likelihood function for small
(large) groups.
Table 1.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates (all 20 rounds)
(a) λˆmle and semle
Group-size Complete Incomplete
Small 0.320
(0.014)
0.523
(0.030)
Large 0.440
(0.027)
0.557
(0.045)
Table 1.3 presents the parameter estimates for each treatment, along with
standard errors. It is immediately apparent that 0 < λ <∞ for every treatment.
Therefore, players are not mixing uniformly, nor are they perfectly coordinating
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on a Nash equilibrium. The only two estimates of lambda that are not significantly
different are the two incomplete information treatments. The fact these estimates
vary across treatments is not terribly surprising, since the parameter has very
little intrinsic interpretation across these resulting non-trivial transformations of
payoffs.
Using these parameter values, it is now possible to make specific predictions
using the QRE, and to compare these predictions with observed behavior. While
the mean predictions of the QRE model plotted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 use binomial
probabilities across states, I use the realized frequencies of each state within the
experiment to make average predictions in Tables 1.4-1.7. That way, any gap
between the model’s predictions and the measured variables reflects true errors
in prediction; not a gap between the ex-ante and ex-post distribution of states.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the group-level comparisons, while Tables 1.6 and 1.7
do the same for individuals. Tables 1.4 and 1.6 present information in levels, while
Tables 1.5 and 1.7 focus on changes (comparative statics).
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Table 1.4: Estimated and Predicted Levels for Groups
Estimate Small Small Large Large
Variable Prediction Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
Provision Data 0.675
(0.037)
0.586
(0.042)
0.425
(0.055)
0.525
(0.056)
Rate QRE 0.405 0.320 0.180 0.174
Total Data 1.061
(0.014)
1.008
(0.013)
0.968
(0.016)
1.002
(0.011)
Contributions QRE 0.920 0.895 0.841 0.823
Variance Data 0.006
(0.030)
0.024
(0.005)
0.019
(0.005)
0.010
(0.003)
of Total QRE 0.053 0.063 0.029 0.032
Over-contribution Data 0.144
(0.028)
0.141
(0.029)
0.133
(0.038)
0.133
(0.038)
Rate QRE 0.156 0.147 0.190 0.202
It is clear from Table 1.4 and Figure 1.9 that the QRE systematically under-
predicts total relative contributions and average provision rates. Likewise, the
model over-predicts the variance of total contribution. Both of these findings are
consistent with the notion that λ is biased downward by a false assumption of
homogeneity (Golman, 2011). Nonetheless, there is one dimension on which QRE
truly shines. Several observations include over-bidding by low types. Regardless of
the reason for this behavior, the QRE predicts the frequency of over-contribution
quite well. This stands in stark contrast to Nash predictions, which do not allow
a player to over-contribute in equilibrium.22
22Technically, the Nash equilibria do not allow an individual to bid more than her valuation
in equilibrium, unless total pledges are so low that players find themselves in the dominated
region of the strategy space. Contributions were consistently close to the threshold throughout
this experiment, so this explanation of over-contribution lacks credibility.
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Figure 1.9: Total Contributions by Group across Rounds
Looking at differences as opposed to levels (Table 1.5), the evidence is a
bit more nuanced. Increasing information raises average contributions for small
groups by 5.3% relative to the threshold (p < 0.01), but QRE predicts an only
half of that increase at 2.5%. Meanwhile, increasing group-size reduces the pro-
vision rate by 25% points (p < 0.01) and reduces relative contributions by 9.3%
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(p < 0.01) under complete information, while QRE predicts very similar decreases
of 22.5% points and 7.9%, respectively. Lastly, increasing group-size lowers the
standard deviation of average contributions for large groups by 5.2% relative to
the threshold (p = 0.01), while the logit equilibrium predicts a reduction of 7.2%.
These are the only four group-level comparative statics with significance at or
below the 5% level, and the sign of each effect is correctly predicted by QRE.
Table 1.5: Information and Group-size Effects for Groups
Estimate Info Effect Info Effect Size Effect Size Effect
Variable Prediction Small Large Complete Incomplete
Provision Data 0.089
(0.056)
−0.100
(0.076)
−0.250∗∗∗
(0.067)
−0.061
(0.070)
Rate QRE 0.085 0.006 −0.225 −0.146
Total Data 0.053∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.034∗
(0.019)
−0.093∗∗∗
(0.021)
−0.006
(0.017)
Contributions QRE 0.025 0.018 −0.079 −0.072
Variance Data 0.007
(0.008)
0.009∗
(0.005)
−0.011
(0.007)
−0.013∗∗
(0.005)
of Total QRE −0.010 −0.00. −0.024 −0.031
Over-contribution Data 0.003
(0.040)
0.000
(0.054)
−0.011
(0.047)
−0.008
(0.048)
Rate QRE 0.009 −0.012 0.034 0.055
Info Effect = Complete - Incomplete, Group-size Effect = Large - Small
For large groups, there is some evidence that increasing information reduces
average total contribution by 3.4% relative to the threshold (p = 0.08), in addition
to increasing the standard deviation of by 3.7% (p = 0.09). At first, this appears
to be an example of the “less-is-more” effect of information under bounded ra-
tionality described by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), wherein a reduction of
information leads to decisions that increase expected payoffs. Upon close inspec-
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tion of the data, this finding is instead driven by outlier performance from group
2 in the treatment with large groups and complete information, dragging down
the performance of the complete information treatment. This particular group
only managed to achieve the threshold in 20% of the potentially paid rounds,
and had an average of total contributions 15% below the threshold. Because the
large-group treatments only contain four groups each, one outlier group can have
significant impact on overall estimates.
A summary of individual contributions can be found in Table 1.6. Unsurpris-
ingly, I find that high value players tend to pledge more, on average, than low
value players. The QRE is able to replicate this basic feature. With the excep-
tion of average contributions by high value players in small groups, the model
again underestimates the average level and overestimates the variance of individ-
ual pledges across all treatments and payoff types. Unfortunately, this gap in
prediction reinforces a key short-coming of this work: the need for heterogeneity
in the logit parameter.
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Table 1.6: Estimated and Predicted Levels for Individuals
Estimate Small Small Large Large
Variable Value Prediction Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
Low Data 16.179
(0.449)
17.169
(0.445)
15.151
(0.431)
16.753
(0.431)
Individual Low QRE 11.309 11.459 11.922 12.220
Mean High Data 25.461
(0.411)
23.531
(0.473)
23.498
(0.426)
23.156
(0.426)
High QRE 24.620 24.358 21.424 20.735
Low Data 49.939
(6.238)
35.924
(6.185)
57.210
(5.987)
51.683
(5.987)
Individual Low QRE 58.571 52.601 67.285 69.633
Variance High Data 63.069
(5.714)
26.022
(6.573)
108.168
(5.931)
67.296
(5.931)
High QRE 91.459 66.596 110.157 100.822
Table 1.7 presents the differences that exist at the individual-level. The average
contributions of high types exceeds that of low types in every treatment. Also, high
value players admit a greater variance in contributions, but only in small groups
under complete information. More information increases the average pledges of
high types in small groups, while it decreases the average pledges of low types
in large groups. In addition, increasing information increases the variance of
contributions by high types, regardless of group-size. Increasing group-size reduces
the average pledges of high types under complete information, but it increases
the variance of high types’ contributions under both information complete and
incomplete information. All twelve of these comparison are significant below the
1% level, and QRE correctly predicts the sign of each one; though it certainly has
trouble predicting the magnitudes of these differences.
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Table 1.7: Information, Group-size, and Payoff-Type Effects for Individuals
(a) Effect on Mean
Data Data QRE QRE
Variable Low High Low High
Information Small −0.990
(0.632)
1.930∗∗∗
(0.626)
−0.15 0.262
Effect Large −1.602∗∗∗
(0.609)
0.242
(0.603)
−0.298 0.689
Low High Low High
Group-size Complete −1.029∗
(0.622)
−1.963∗∗∗
(0.592)
0.613 −3.196
Effect Incomplete −0.416
(0.619)
−0.274
(0.637)
0.761 −3.623
Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
Payoff-type Small 9.281∗∗∗
(0.608)
6.361∗∗∗
(0.649)
13.311 12.899
Effect Large 8.347∗∗∗
(0.606)
6.503∗∗∗
(0.606)
9.502 8.515
(b) Effect on Variance
Data Data QRE QRE
Variable Low High Low High
Information Small 14.015
(8.785)
37.048∗∗∗
(8.710)
5.97 24.863
Effect Large 5.527
(8.467)
40.873∗∗∗
(8.389)
−2.348 9.335
Low High Low High
Group-size Complete 7.271
(8.646)
45.099∗∗∗
(8.236)
8.714 18.698
Effect Incomplete 15.758∗
(8.608)
41.273∗∗∗
(8.854)
17.032 34.226
Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
Payoff-type Small 13.131
(8.460)
−9.902
(9.026)
32.888 13.995
Effect Large 50.959∗∗∗
(8.428)
15.613∗
(8.428)
42.872 31.189
Info Effect = Complete - Incomplete, Group-size Effect = Large - Small, Payoff-type Effect =
High - Low
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1.4 Discussion
Many lab experiments find anomalous behavior regarding the provision of pub-
lic goods. For example, the Nash equilibrium level of individual contributions is
zero in the canonical linear public good game, while the socially optimal outcome
is for everyone to contribute as much as possible. As has been documented by
an extensive literature (Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1997), observed
contributions are typically greater than the free-rider level but less than the op-
timal level. Two theories, in particular, have been promoted to explain these
stylized facts: (i) decision error and ii) altruism. It is not clear how to separately
identify each motivation in the linear public goods game, as any strictly positive
contribution below one’s own endowment is rationalizable by either method.
Using a novel experimental design, Andreoni (1995) made significant head-
way on this identification problem.23 Varying information regarding the relative
rank of players’ contributions, and in one treatment transforming payoffs into a
zero-sum game over rank, the author isolates a lower bound on the fraction of
contributions that are plausibly pure “kindness”. Three quarters of all contribu-
tions were positive, about half of which are attributed to altruism. In follow up
work, Andreoni and Miller (2002) conduct an experiment to test whether observed
23The author does discuss the potential interaction of altruism and confusion, as notions of
fairness often give rise to multiple equilibria, which may further exacerbate confusion.
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giving in various parameterizations of the dictator game could also be rationalized
by standard, quasi-concave preferences over payoffs of self and others. They find
that 47% of subjects may be exactly characterized as either purely self-interested,
utilitarian, or Leontief (perfect equity). The remaining subjects were grouped into
these three categories by minimizing the distance from their choice to the respec-
tive predictions. Assuming CES utility over payoffs, the elasticity of substitution
and payoff weights were estimated for each remaining group. The results strongly
support the hypothesis that unobserved, heterogeneous altruistic preferences ex-
plain a great deal of observed giving.
Yet, there always remains room for decision error as well. Houser and Kurzban
(2002) replicate the experimental design from Andreoni (1995), except they pit
subjects against computers in one treatment to remove any last vestiges of social
norms, reciprocity, or fairness considerations. They also estimate that half of
positive contributions are altruistic and half are mistakes, perfectly in line with
the results of Andreoni (1995). Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) test two competing
notions of kindness in a public goods game: pure altruism (care about others’
payoffs) and warm-glow (enjoy the act of giving). The experiment rotates the
private return to contributions to the public good to each player in each round,
which also rotates the maximum total benefit to the public good. This should have
large effects under pure altruism but no effect on warm-glow. The authors find
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strong support for warm-glow but little evidence of pure altruism.24 It would seem
that the appropriate method to model altruism will always be context-specific, and
it will depend on the experimental design and the relative importance of errors.
One unsatisfactory aspect of these previous papers is that they lack a formal
notion of confusion, thus rendering the term as a catch-all for any non-Nash, non-
altruistic behavior. By contrast, Anderson et al. (1998) propose using the logit
equilibrium to model decision error by subjects in linear and quadratic public
goods games. Contributions appear to increase stochastically with the marginal
value of the public good, representing the kind of magnitude effects that are
best described by models of stochastic choice. However, adding pure altruism
and warm-glow substantially increases the fit of the logit equilibrium model to
the data. Offerman et al. (1998) actually use QRE to model decision errors in
contributions to the step return game (a discrete variant of the threshold game).
The authors find the model’s predictions useful, though the results favor a naive
Bayesian model of stochastic choice, in which individuals’ expectations of the
others’ contributions are overly optimistic. Unfortunately, this paper does not
incorporate altruism into utility when comparing these two models.
24Perhaps rotating payoffs across players and rounds complicates the environment which, in
turn, exacerbates confusion. If this is true, then decision error will play an important role in
the experiment conducted for this research.
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The takeaway from all of this is that both altruism and decision error play a
prominent role in explaining individual behavior in any public goods game. The
debate is not a matter of one over the other, but simply a question of degree.
Therefore, it seems sensible to account for both features explicitly. Of course, the
validity of these estimates will depend upon the functional forms. It is common
practice to use the simple specifications such as a linear function over payoffs.
ui = pii + αpi−i for α ≥ 0 (1.6)
These preferences (perfect substitutes) lead to corner solutions that unam-
biguously bias contributions upwards in the threshold game. If α = 0, the model
simplifies to pure self-interest. For 0 < α < 1, each player places greater weight
upon a unit increase her own payoff than for others. A player would be will-
ing to contribute more than her valuation to the public good if she is pivotal in
reaching the threshold, so long as the discounted benefit to others exceeds the
potential cost to self. Yet, assuming one is already at the threshold, there would
be no willingness to sacrifice an additional unit of payoff in order to redistribute
payoffs to others through the over-contribution refund. In the case that α = 1,
payoff preferences represent pure utilitarianism. In the threshold game, any set
of pledges greater than or equal to the threshold will be strictly equally preferred
60
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
to any set of pledges that fail, and players are indifferent between every set of
pledges greater than or equal to the threshold, biasing individual contributions
upwards and implying that total contributions should lie above the threshold. In
the extreme case where α > 1, players have a strict preference for maximizing the
benefit of others’ at the expense of self, without bound, which seems unlikely in
most circumstances.
When considering warm-glow, an equally simply linear form is often sufficient:
ui = pii + γci for γ ≥ 0 (1.7)
Given the discontinuous structure of payoffs in the threshold game, it is best to
consider the effect of warm-glow in two cases. If the threshold is not achieved, than
utility is simply the warm-glow component ui = γci, which pushes incentives to
contribute up towards the threshold, and away from the inefficient Nash equilibria
with very little contribution. If the threshold is reached, then warm-glow increases
utility while the reduction in monetary payoff reduces utility. How these forces
net out is highly complex, in theory, given the non-linear nature of the refunded
over-contributions. However, in the experimental data the refund appeared to
have a relatively negligent effect on realized payoffs, as can be seen in Figure 1.10
when restricting data to when the threshold was at least achieved. For the sake of
61
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
parsimony, I will briefly assume the refund is off so that the combined utility from
monetary payments and warm glow will be ui = vi− (1− γ)ci when the threshold
is reached.
Figure 1.10: Mean Individual Payoffs by Contribution
If γ = 1, then warm-glow cancels out the monetary loss of further contribu-
tions, making one indifferent between any set of contributions that reaches or
surpasses the threshold, just as was the case for pure utilitarianism with α = 1.
For γ < 1 the warm-glow only partially offsets the monetary losses from further
contribution, which means that only contribution vectors that perfectly achieve
the threshold will be equilibria; although, these equilibria may include individuals
contributing more than their valuations in some cases. This prediction coincides
with the altruistic preferences with α < 1. For γ > 1 the utility from warm-glow
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swamps the monetary losses from contributing, suggesting that anyone should
contribute her whole endowment. This does not seem like a useful description in
most circumstances.
Another standard model of preferences over payoffs regards fairness. Perhaps
individuals prefer a specific level or share of total benefits relative to others. Such
ideas are captured by perfect complements preferences using a Leontief utility
function over payoffs:
ui = min {pii, βpi−i} for β ≥ −1/2 (1.8)
A Rawlsian would put equal weight upon each individual. That corresponds to a
value of β = 1/(n − 1), so that for every one unit increase in pii there is a corre-
sponding n− 1 unit increase in pi−i. For the threshold game, the total amount of
net benefit is a fixed value; though, it is state-dependent and, therefore. There-
fore, Leontief social preferences are equivalent to Cobb-Douglas social preferences
in this game. If β > 1/(n − 1), an individual prefers more than an equal share
of the gains, and vice versa for lower values of β. In fact, preferences converge
to pure self-interest as β → ∞, and concern for others at the expense of self as
β → −1/2. For values in between, each player admits a desired share of β/(1+β).
63
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
Therefore, the full range of outcomes in which total contributions meet or exceed
the threshold are rationalizable according to some parameter value.
There are a few complications in interpreting fairness with this data. First,
notice that the total amount of net benefit from providing the public good is
state dependent. Hence, a preference for fixed share of benefits is not only going
to require differing contributions by payoff type, but also by state of the world.
This added complexity may decrease the relative prominence of fairness concerns
relative to decision errors. Likewise, there is some natural ambiguity as to whether
equal net gains is the only salient notion of equity. For example, it may be
that subjects wish to equalize contributions instead. In this experiment, every
individual would pledge 20. The threshold would be met, exactly, in every possible
state of nature. Low types will always receive a net gain of zero, while high types
evenly split the gains. Further alternatives include benefit or cost shares that are
distributed in proportion to private valuations of the public good, which could
be represented using specific parameter values of Leontief utility. All of this the
natural ambiguity regarding fairness, which is certainly common in real-world
applications, is reason to expect a greater role for confusion.
As this experiment is designed, it is not particularly easy to separate out
different types and parameterizations of altruism and fairness. This is due in
part to the overlapping predictions of large sets of individual contributions at or
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exceeding the threshold. It is also due to the natural ambiguities of the very notion
of fairness in this environment with asymmetric and changing private values to
the public good. Thankfully, pioneering work by Offerman and Sonnemans (1996)
addresses many of these issues directly in the step return public goods game. They
independently measure and categorize participants’ social preferences, and they
find evidence in favor of warm-glow altruism. Yet, they also find that individuals
occasionally, but systematically, violate their own alleged preferences. To quote
from their findings, “Although the present study clearly indicates that individuals
do vary in their preferences regarding outcomes for others, it turns out to be very
difficult to rationalise all choices. Some decisions simply seem to be errors from
an economic point of view.” Given the multiplicity of Nash equilibria under self-
interest, altruism, warm-glow, and fairness, it should be no surprise that subjects
are confused.
Evidently, what they are confused about are the ever-changing pledges of other
group members. They do not appear to improve either, as there is no trend in total
contributions or provision rates across rounds. The threshold is exactly achieved
in only 4% of all potentially paid group-rounds, constituting 17 instances out of a
total 460 group-rounds in the experiment. Clearly, it is difficult to coordinate total
contributions directly onto the target threshold. Only in one of these cases did the
group manage to repeat this achievement in a subsequent round; although, the
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threshold was exceeded in fifteen cases and missed in two. Overall, there appears
to be a bias in achieving provision, as one would expect with altruism. About
54% of total contributions exceed the threshold in each group-round, while 42%
fall short, and these rates do not adjust significantly conditional upon success in a
previous round. Still, groups do appear to adjust contributions in the direction of
increasing payoffs. Total contributions fall an average of 10 units in the subsequent
round after exceeding the threshold. Likewise, they tend to rise by 12 units
starting from below and 6 units starting at the threshold.
The fact that there is no trend in total contributions or provision rates across
rounds, that total contributions are likely to change after a round where the
threshold is exactly achieved, that the rate of achieving provision does not change
conditional upon success in a previous rounds all lends strong support to the
concept of a stochastic steady-state. Furthermore, the tendency of total contri-
butions to decrease when above the threshold in previous rounds and vice versa
when they were below is consistent with the motivation of noisy directional learn-
ing behind the logit equilibrium (Anderson et al., 2004). Players update choices in
the direction of increasing expected payoffs, but they consistently make mistakes
with regard to magnitudes. Presumably, this is because they cannot accurately
predict the degree to which others will adjust their contributions. The result is
a stochastic steady-state in which realized contributions bounce noisily about the
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threshold, but a persistent degree of decision error prevents convergence, just as
appears in this data.
To summarize, all of the discussion here favors the inclusion of decision er-
rors and altruism in any public goods model. The preference specifications above
predict a similar increase in individual contributions relative to self-interested
preferences, both below the threshold (away from the inefficient equilibria) and
above the threshold (α = 1, γ ∼ 1, β → 0), so it seems intuitive that incorporat-
ing altruism into the QRE model will stochastically increase contributions. This
adjustment to incentives would seem a promising route at first blush, given the
systematic under-prediction of the QRE model in Tables 4 and 6. A note of cau-
tion is in order here, as one should recall that QRE accounts for the feedback
loop of stochastic choice on beliefs. While it appears that contributions should
be increasing in α and γ, the realization that every other player will increase
her contributions may be cause to reduce one’s own contributions, especially if
α, γ ∈ (0, 1). How these competing incentives net out requires numerically esti-
mating the model itself.
The beauty of the QRE to model is that the stochastic predictions allow for
structural estimates of any number of model parameters, in addition to the degree
of noisiness, such as the coefficients on altruistic preferences. The danger of QRE
is the computation complexity behind estimating the range of fixed-points nec-
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essary to build the model and the structural estimators. Anderson et al. (1998)
estimate a three parameter model (λ, α, γ), but the linear utility had a closed-form
equilibrium, and the quadratic specification lead to an estimator with a Gaussian
distribution. To do a similar analysis with the threshold game would substantially
improve this work, but the discontinuous nature of payoffs and the particular de-
sign of this experiment (changing states, changing information, changing group-
size) make this a computationally heavy lift using currently available tools. For
one thing, it is not even clear that pure-altruism or Leontief preferences will satisfy
the requirements of a stochastic potential game, while warm-glow can be easily
incorporated into utility by θi(ci) = vi + γci. Coincidentally, Offerman and Son-
nemans (1996) only found evidence for warm-glow utility in the discrete threshold
game, so both the theory and previous empirical work support a two-parameter
extension of the model (λ, γ).
1.5 Conclusion
The purpose of using QRE in this research is straightforward: to obtain theo-
retical comparative statics that are normally indeterminate, due to the threshold
game’s multiplicity of equilibria. Using pure strategies under complete informa-
tion, there are dominated equilibria with very little total contribution and a pro-
vision rate of zero, and there are efficient equilibria with total contributions at the
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threshold and a provision rate of one. This is true for any group-size, so long as
total benefits exceed the threshold. Thus, any predicted difference across group-
size using pure-strategy Nash equilibrium requires an ad-hoc switch in equilibrium
selection as group-size grows.
Yet, the data presented here show strong evidence against the proposition that
players are coordinating on dominated equilibria, as total contributions tend to be
near the threshold. In fact, the data suggest that players fail to coordinate, gen-
erally, as total contributions admit a stationary degree of noise across all rounds.
The logit equilibrium is a stochastic steady state in which players respond to
their incentives, albeit imperfectly, so it seems well-equipped to explain coordina-
tion failure that tends to be near the threshold. The stationary noise about the
threshold in Figures 1.8 and 1.9 appear remarkably consistent with such a state
of affairs.
This approach proves fruitful, as the model is able to make the necessary
comparative static predictions that are otherwise left ambiguous. QRE accurately
predicts the sign of all nineteen of the comparative statics that are significant at
the 5% level in this experiment. The model does a reasonable job of capturing
the magnitudes of these effects at the group-level; though the same cannot be said
about individual contributions. Furthermore, the model tends to systematically
under-predict the level of average contributions and over-predict the variance of
69
Chapter 1. Explaining pledges to threshold public goods with logit equilibrium
contributions, at both the individual and group level. It also tends to under-
predict the average provision rate (Figure 1.9); although, it does a good job of
explaining over-contributions by low payoff players.
However, these biases in prediction are potentially informative. Golman (2011)
proved that the misspecification of homogeneity in the logit parameter introduces
downward bias, i.e., estimates will over-state the degree of bounded rationality.
In this environment, that is consistent with a lower average and greater variance
of contributions for individuals and groups. One obvious solution is to allow the
logit parameter to float across payoff types, as this would preserve symmetry. If
this approach were successful, it might also be possible to restrict the degrees
of freedom across treatments. Thus, heterogeneity in the noise parameter across
individuals may improve the accuracy of predictions, while weakening the criticism
of over-fitting.
This research has yet to formally incorporate a measure of altruism into the
QRE model. This would allow for structural estimation of the altruism param-
eters. Such motivations are common considerations in any public goods game,
and the basic intuition that this will bias contributions upward fits with the bias
in levels of current QRE predictions. However, altruism and fairness alone that
ignore decision error will be of limited value for this game, as the set of equilibria
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tend to include all contributions at or above the threshold; making comparative
static predictions impossible.
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Chapter 2
Noisy best response and scale
illusion in the market entry game
2.1 Introduction
The market entry game is a simple representation of an important and general
payoff structure found in economic life. In this environment, each player faces
a binary choice between “entering” or “staying out” of a market. Staying out
affords a reservation wage, while entry yields a wage that is decreasing linearly
in the total number of entrants. The market capacity is defined as the total level
of entry at which payoffs between entering and staying out are equalized for all
players. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium predicts, unsurprisingly, that players
will choose to enter the market up to its capacity.
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The first and most direct interpretation of this game is the market entry choice
faced by firms in microeconomics. In the long run, firms will produce at minimum
average cost, suggesting that markets will only have a finite carrying capacity for
profitable firms. Likewise, the Cournot model predicts that profits will decrease
from monopoly rents to competitive profits as the number of firms grows and
market power vanishes. Since each entering firm imposes a negative externality
on the payoffs of others, a second interpretation is that of an n-player, binary
choice tragedy of the commons game. Lastly, the notion of a congestable public
good leads naturally to the classic highway congestion problem with linear time
costs. Here, travelers choose between a riskless but circuitous path, such as a
beltway, and a risky but direct path, such as a bridge. On the risky route, travel
times are increasing in the number of travelers. Nash equilibrium implies that
all of the time-saving benefits of the highway will be dissipated by congestion
in equilibrium. This is known as the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox (Arnott and
Small, 1994).
However, understanding of observed behavior in this environment is largely
incomplete. In the case of homogeneous preferences, the Nash equilibrium con-
cept is silent about exactly which subset of players will enter the market. In fact,
any combination of entrance/abstention is acceptable, so long as the total num-
ber of entrants is equal to the market capacity. It is reasonable to suspect that
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players will fail to coordinate exactly at the market capacity in the absence of com-
munication, especially in a one-shot environment. To complicate matters, there
are several mixed-strategy Nash equilibria as well. There is a unique, symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which every player chooses to enter the market with
the same probability. There are also a host of asymmetric equilibria in which some
players enter or stay out of the market with certainty, while others mix between
entry and abstaining with some homogeneous probability.
The selection of an equilibrium that either (a) best represents observed be-
havior or (b) is socially desirable is far from obvious. Payoff-dominance would
suggest that firms with the highest amount of strategic risk should enter the mar-
ket, while risk-dominance would suggest the opposite. On the other hand, payoff
dominance would suggest that travelers with the highest value of time should be
sorted onto the bridge, which does make a good deal of sense from a policy per-
spective. The equilibrium refinement that is desirable or most applicable depends
upon the interpretation of the environment.
Given the theoretical indeterminacy of predictions, the Nash equilibrium con-
cept has limited use in predicting behavior here. Thankfully, experimental meth-
ods have proven to be an important tool for learning about decision-making in
such cases. Due to its wide applicability, this particular game has been studied
extensively in the experimental literature (Rapoport, 1995; Rapoport et al., 1998;
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Selten et al., 2007), including analysis using models of learning (Rapoport et al.,
2002; Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Duffy and Hopkins, 2005), or measurements of
overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Most of these analyses focus on per-
fect versus imperfect information regarding the actions of others, while Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) focuses on incomplete information regarding one’s own type.
This paper focuses on payoff heterogeneity, payoff uncertainty, and group-size
effects. Specifically, I examine payoff heterogeneity that takes the form of affine
transformations, implying homogeneous preferences for entry. Payoff types are
distributed as high or low with equal probability, and each player always knows
her own payoff-type. All players know the full state of nature under complete
information, while they only know the binomial distribution over others’ types
under private information. I also vary group-size and the market capacity such
that the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium is fixed. These treatments are
designed so that there should be no systematic differences across payoff-type,
group-size, information completeness, or state of the world so long as individuals
behave in accordance with strict best-response.
Given the difficulty of the coordination problem presented to players, there
is little reason to believe that perfect coordination upon a single, pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium will ever obtain. Previous research has found that decision-
makers are noisy and that coordination is unstable in this environment (Hartman,
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2007). However, a lack of perfect coordination by no means disproves that players
behave in accordance with best-response, given the large number of mixed-strategy
equilibria. Under complete information, these mixed equilibria should still exhibit
uniform entry rates across payoff-type. Under private information, there is some
allowance for heterogeneity in individual entry rates. However, such heterogeneity
must leave the best response of all other players unperturbed.
The experimental findings presented here strongly reject these neutral compar-
ative statics, as well as the restrictions that the mixed Nash equilibria impose upon
the data. Therefore, an alternative model of noisy decision-making is required. I
apply quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which relaxes the assumption of pure
best-response and side-steps the issue of indeterminacy. This approach is fruitful
in that it provides unique predictions that account for the dozens of systematic
differences across payoff-type, information completeness, group-size, and state of
the world observed in the experiment. Thus, I find that the noisy behavior ob-
served in these games is both tractable and rationalizable with a model of noisy
best-response, while the same cannot be said of pure best-response without the
addition of unobserved preference heterogeneity.
It should be no surprise that a model of quantal response behavior matches
the data well, so it is important to emphasize what distinguishes this theoretical
model from more typical econometric tools. The most comparable technique for
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this environment would be a binary response model such as a logit regression.
Such models are often applied atheoretically; although, McFadden (1974) showed
how they can be motivated through an underlying model of random utility, i.e.,
unobservable preference shocks. This makes sense for decisions made in mar-
kets, where all interaction across individuals is indirectly channeled through the
price mechanism. Thus, it is perfect reasonable to assume a unidirectional flow of
causality from expected utility to choice probabilities. By contrast, games specify
environments where agents interact directly, i.e., every player’s expected utility is
defined as an explicit function of every other player’s choice probabilities. Hence,
causality flows in both directions, implying that expected utility and choice prob-
abilities are simultaneously determined. One must apply an equilibrium model
to account for this reverberation of noise across individuals; or else risk obtaining
biased estimates and predictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
theoretical model of the market entry game; including some of the predictions and
characteristics of NE and QRE, under both complete and private information.
Section 2.3 describes both experimental designs, presents the data, and conducts
a battery of tests to demonstrate the relative value of QRE. Section 2.4 discusses
the econometric advantage of QRE over the common conditional logit regression.
Section 2.5 concludes with remarks for future research.
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2.2 Equilibria in the Market Entry Game
The model is defined as follows. There are n players indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Each player must choose either to “enter” (si = 1) or “stay out” (si = 0) of the
market. Payoffs to entry are defined linearly, in keeping with the literature:
ui(si, s−i) =

a+ vi(c− S) if si = 1
r if si = 0
(2.9)
where S =
∑n
i=1 si is the total number of entrants, a is the fixed component of
the wage to entry, r is the reservation wage, c is the market capacity, and vi is
player i’s payoff type. In this paper, both experiments restrict a = r, implying
homogeneous costs to entry.25 The market capacity is defined irrespective of the
composition of payoffs.
2.2.1 Nash and Bayes-Nash Equilibria
In this section, I will review the set of Nash equilibria originally discussed
in Rapoport et al. (1998), and I will extend these results to Bayesian game with
private information. The set of Bayes-Nash equilibria under complete information
25One exception to this rule is the toll treatment in Experiment I that reduces a < r. In this
case, payoff types (vi) are homogeneous, so the result is isomorphic to a simple reduction in the
capacity, c. Without this restriction, variability in vi could generate variation in preferences for
entry across payoff types.
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corresponds to the set of cursed equilibria (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) since each
player’s payoffs are fully independent of other palyers’ types. This last statement
implies that the set of Nash equilibria under complete information are a nested
subset of the Bayes-Nash equilibria under incomplete information. Moreover, the
set of cursed equilibria implies a testable restriction on the form of individual
heterogeneity in entry rates that will be utilized in the results section.
One set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this context are rather obvious:
namely, any situation such that the market is just at capacity (S = c), in which
everyone who enters earns at least the reservation wage, while those who stay out
strictly prefer to remain out. Additionally, any combination of entry that is one
firm short of capacity (S = c−1) is also a Nash equilibrium. This is because all of
the firms who choose to enter earn strictly more than the reservation wage, while
all of the firms who stay out are indifferent about entering. All of these equilibria
are weakly stable under best-reply dynamics.
Solving for the mixed-strategy equilibria is a bit more complicated, but the
intuition is straightforward. A player who strictly best responds will be willing to
mix between entering and staying out of the market if and only if she is indifferent
between these two choices. Therefore, any individual who chooses a mixed strategy
must do so because the expected payoff to entry is equal to the reservation wage.
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Otherwise stated, a player is only willing to mix if the expected gain to entry is
zero.
Although, the solution is identical to the results presented in Rapoport et al.
(1998), the set of mixed-strategy equilibria is restated below for the purpose of
exposition (see Theorem 1 in appendix A). Assuming that nin and nout players
deterministically choose to enter or stay out of the market, respectively, then all
remaining players will choose to enter the market with probability:
p =
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 (2.10)
Importantly, this probability is the same for every player who mixes, regardless of
payoff-type. In the special case that all players choose to mix, we have the sym-
metric equilibrium where everyone chooses to enter the market with probability
p = (c− 1)/(n− 1). As this is the only equilibrium in which everyone pursues the
same strategy, it represents a focal point.
Given the apparent irrelevance of payoff heterogeneity under complete infor-
mation, it is natural to wonder what would happen if players were not privy to
such information. To be specific, I will continue to assume that each player has
private information regarding her own type, vi. However, I will answer the ques-
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tion: “what happens if players only know the ex-ante distribution of other players’
payoff types?”
Each vi is drawn i.i.d. from a finite set of values V = {v1, ..., vK}, with a generic
probability measure P (vk) = q
k, and I will assume that all of this is common
knowledge. Under these conditions, the market entry game is transformed into
a Bayesian game, in which the appropriate solution concept for prediction is the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Therefore, an equilibrium must specify the action that
each player will take contingent upon every payoff-type.
All of the Nash equilibria under complete information remain Bayes-Nash equi-
libria under this definition of incomplete information. To understand why, note
that the composition of payoff types was irrelevant under complete information.
Therefore, it is simply a matter of transcribing these equilibria into the proper
Bayesian notation. For example, the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is
defined by the following probability of entry for every player at every payoff type:
pki =
c− 1
n− 1 ∀ i ∈ I, vk ∈ V (2.11)
In a Bayesian game, a player is willing to mix between entry and exit if the
expected payoff to entry is equal to the reservation wage, where expectations are
taken over the type-contingent choice probabilities of others. Therefore, any player
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may choose to enter with different type-contingent probabilities, so long as this
deviation leaves the expected payoffs of every other player undisturbed relative to
the original Nash equilibria with complete information. Thus, the set of Bayes-
Nash equilibria extends the set of all Nash equilibria to include any individual
heterogeneity that is robust to cursed beliefs (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). To see
this, please see Theorem 2 in appendix B; although, the matter is trivial once one
recognizes the fact that no individual’s payoffs depend upon other players’ types
within this game. The implication for the binary type space used for experiment
II is that any individual may choose to increase her rate of entry as a high (low)
type, so long as she reduces her rate of entry as a low (high) type to balance out
everyone else’s expected payoffs. Importantly, this implies a simple set of testable
restrictions on the data that are examined in the last part of section 2.3.
2.2.2 Quantal Response Equilibria
Under the assumption of pure best-response, and without additional restric-
tions, individual choices remain indeterminate within this environment. While
many sensible restrictions could resolve this strategic uncertainty, the data sug-
gest that subjects struggle to anticipate each others’ actions correctly. Yet, it is
often argued that individuals must somehow form beliefs in order to make de-
cisions (Morris and Shin, 2001; van Huyck and Viriyavipart, 2013). Therefore,
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this indeterminacy should be interpreted as a failing of the model, not individual
behavior, and another model should be used which provides more meaningful pre-
dictions. To that end, I propose using logit quantal response equilibrium, which
relaxes the assumption of individual best-response, while maintaining the equilib-
rium assumption that choices and beliefs be mutually consistent. This approach
yields meaningful theoretical prediction that resolve the indeterminacy and strate-
gic uncertainty found under strict best response.
Formally, a logit quantal response equilibrium is defined by the following:
i. A set of quantal response functions {σi}ni=1 that monotonically transform
expected payoffs into choice probabilities according to the logit specification:
σi(si;λ) =
exp(λ pii(si))∑
si
exp(λ pii(si))
(2.12)
ii. Expected payoffs that correctly account for the noisy behavior of others:
pii(ci) = ui(ci, σ−i) (2.13)
The exact cause of this deviation from pure best-response may remain unspecified.
It may include many mutually consistent alternatives such as bounded rational-
ity (Chen et al., 1997), noisy learning (Anderson et al., 2004), random utility, a
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preference for unpredictability or a cost to accuracy, fairness or altruism. The
key feature that distinguishes logit QRE from, say, a logit regression model is
the requirement that beliefs correctly account for the effect that each individual’s
noisiness has on every other player. Therefore, expected payoffs and choice prob-
abilities are simultaneously determined, and the QRE explicitly accounts for the
reverberation of noise across individuals in addition to individual noisiness, itself.
In games with a unique Nash equilibrium, the logit QRE is unique for every
value of λ ∈ [0,∞). This is not necessarily the case in games of multiple equilibria,
such as the market entry game. However, it is clear that QRE is always unique
for λ = 0, where every player must be randomizing uniformly over actions. In
fact, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) demonstrate that this uniqueness holds for
every λ ∈ [0, λ∗], where λ∗ is some constant that is specific to the game, as
well as the particular parameterization. Moreover, the authors prove that there
exists a continuous correspondence of equilibria connecting uniform mixing at
λ = 0 to a generically unique Nash equilibrium as λ → ∞. In the event that
a game has multiple equilibria and is perfectly symmetric, as will be the case in
experiment I and certain instances in experiment II, this uniqueness may no longer
hold. Fortunately, this issue does not apply to the market entry game, as will be
explained in the next section where I describe the limiting equilibria. Therefore,
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the principal branch is strictly unique, and provides meaningful predictions for
my purposes.26
While the logit specification prevents closed-form solutions to this fixed point,
modern homotopy methods may be implemented numerically to solve for the prin-
cipal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence. I use the algorithm described
in Turocy (2005) to numerical calculate the principal branch of logit QRE under
complete information. Using the celebrated Harsanyi transformation to concep-
tualize the game of incomplete information as a game of imperfect information
regarding “Nature”, I am able to use the extensive-form analogue to QRE known
as “Agent QRE” (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) to guarantee existence of a so-
lution. I then solve for these equilibria using the algorithm described in Turocy
(2010). Both codes are extensions of the algorithm incorporated into The Gambit
Project (McKelvey et al., 2013); a set of open-source tools for computational game
theorists. Many thanks to Theodore L. Turocy for generously sharing this code,
which is designed to handle games with group-sizes larger than two. The results of
these numerical calculations are then used to construct the structural maximum
likelihood estimators for the logit parameters. Since the model makes stochastic
26The principal branch is the only subset of quantal response equilibria that is applied
throughout the literature. The reasons for this include: (i) it is the only set of equilibria
that we know for certain exists, (ii) it is the only set of equilibria that can possibly exist for
λ ∈ [0, λ∗], and (iii) it is the only set of equilibria that we have a universal method for solving
numerically.
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predictions, the likelihood function for this estimator is defined implicitly by the
quantal response functions as stated below.
L(λ; si) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log σi(si;λ) (2.14)
2.2.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium Predictions
One key feature of QRE is that choice probabilities are sensitive to payoff mag-
nitudes, sometimes referred to as “scale illusion”. In the pure-strategy equilibrium
of the market entry game, where the total number of entrants equals the market
capacity, the average gain to entry is fully dissipated. Hence, there should not
be any difference in entry rates between high and low payoff players, regardless
of scale illusion. However, if such an equilibrium does not attain - not even on
average - then either the market will tend to be systematically above or below its
capacity. Supposing that the market is systematically under capacity, there would
be a consistent and positive average gain to entry, and this gain would be larger
in magnitude for high payoff players than it would be for low players. We might
intuitively expect to find that high payoff players enter more often, since they
have more to gain. The QRE does in fact predict under entry relative to capacity
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in the absence of a toll, given the parameterizations used here. Therefore, the
QRE also predicts a higher rate of entry for high payoff players.27
Armed with this simple intuition, and the knowledge that QRE is symmetric
by payoff-type, it is easy to work through the logic of the limiting logit equilibria
as well. In the case of homogeneous payoffs, it is clear that every player must
enter with identical probabilities. The only symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
game is the mixed-strategy where each player chooses enter with probability p =
(c− 1)/(n− 1), so this is the limiting equilibrium selected in experiment I as well
as the symmetric states of nature in experiment II.28 A similar logic applies to the
other states of nature as well. For example, suppose the game has four players
with a market capacity of three, as will be the case in the small group treatment.
If the realized state has three high players and one low player, then the limit will
be the pure-strategy equilibrium where the three high types enter and the low
type stays out. By contrast, suppose there is one high type and three low types.
In that case, the selected equilibrium will have the high type player entering, while
the remaining low types enter with probability p = (c− 2)/(n− 2); corresponding
to one of the asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. The pattern is quite clear:
27Experiment I makes use of a toll, but given the homogeneous payoffs, I cannot test the
reverse logic regarding payoff types. However, the QRE predicts over entry in this case. As will
be shown in the next section, this is exactly what I find in the data.
28A word of caution here. In a perfectly symmetric game with multiple equilibria, even the
principal branch may be non-unique for some λ∗ > 0, which would imply multiple limiting
equilibria. The reason this is not the case here is because there is one-and-only-one symmetric
Nash equilibrium. That is a feature specific to this particular environment.
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the Nash equilibrium selected by the limit of QRE will be one in which as many
high payoff players enter as possible, while still respecting symmetry.
Of course, not every prediction made by the QRE is different from the stan-
dard Nash predictions. Experiment II is designed so that any pure information
and group-size effects should be negligible according to pure best-response. Quan-
tal response behavior does not have anything substantively different to say about
these variables, individually. Still, the QRE predicts that the difference in en-
try rates between high types and low types contracts as group-size grows. So
while both models do not predict a group-size effect, per se, quantal response
behavior does lead to an interaction effect between group-size and scale illusion
that is absent under best response. As will be discussed in section 2.4, this ef-
fect is also missed by logit regressions that use the average payoffs experience by
subjects within the experiment. The key difference between these approaches is
that a regression assumes unidirectional causality from expected payoffs to choice
probabilities, while logit QRE accounts for the fact that causality flows in both
directions simultaneously. Hence, the QRE is doing more than simply fitting an
econometric model and re-stating the observation that scale illusion matters.
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2.3 The Experiments
This section details the design and results of two experiments. The first ex-
periment uses homogeneous payoffs to create a baseline measure of behavior, and
tests the effect of introducing a toll, i.e., reducing the fixed wage to entry from
a = r = 0 to a < 0. The second experiment uses heterogeneous payoff types,
but with homogeneous preferences, by maintaining a = r = 0 while allowing each
players vi to vary. This experiment tests for scale illusion, payoff uncertainty, and
group-size effects. It is necessary to run a new set of experiments to make sure
that all comparisons across treatments are comparable, since the QRE model is
sensitive to affine transformations of payoffs. Both experiments were conducted
in the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory (EBEL) at UC Santa
Barbara using the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were
randomly recruited from a subset of the undergraduate population that has reg-
istered their desire to participate in experiments.
The first experiment was originally presented in Hartman (2007). It was de-
signed to answer questions about traffic networks and congestion externalities.
However, the market entry game is isomorphic to the Pigou-Knight-Downs para-
dox (Arnott and Small, 1994). This experiment is useful as a baseline scenario
where subjects face perfectly symmetric incentives, remain in fixed groups, and
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observe the total number of entrants between rounds. The environment encour-
ages learning, which gives participants the best chance of achieving either a pure-
strategy equilibrium at the capacity, or the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. In addition, the experiment makes use of a toll to nudge behavior towards
a more socially desirable outcome.
I conducted the second experiment. In this case, the experiment was designed
to focus on group-size and information effects. The private information treatment
makes use of Bayesian games, so subjects values have to be re-drawn each round.
In this experiment, subjects played ten practice rounds where they observed the
total number of entrants after each round, and twenty potentially paid rounds
of each information treatment. To avoid the repeated-game cooperation, groups
are rotated in the practice rounds, and this practice is maintained in the poten-
tially paid rounds to avoid confusion. In this case, the deck is stacked against
convergence to a pure-strategy equilibrium.
There is little evidence for convergence to pure-strategies in either experiment.
In fact, half of all subjects switch choices in a round following an equilibrium
outcome, and this rate increases for the second experiment. These findings are
perfectly consistent with Selten et al. (2007), who study the traffic congestion
problem and find that choice frequencies are unaffected by imperfect information
between rounds, but switching rates increase as information decreases. It seems
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that noisiness and coordination failure are inherent features of the data produced
using this incentive structure. This fact is not terribly sensitive to experimental
design choices regarding perfect/imperfect information. All of this supports the
relevance of QRE, which is successful at explaining the toll effects in experiment
I as well as the interaction of group-size and payoff-type effects in experiment II.
2.3.1 Experiment I
The baseline experiment includes ten sessions. Session nine had only seventeen
subjects, while every other session included eighteen subjects. In all cases, the
market capacity is fixed to eleven. Each session includes two treatments: in the
first, market entry is free, while in the second, entry requires paying a toll. The toll
is designed to reduce the number of entrants to the socially optimal level of five.
Because values are homogeneous in this scenario, adding the toll is isomorphic to
simply reducing the market capacity by six. Sessions include twenty paid rounds
for each treatment, and final payments are determined as the sum over all paid
rounds. Average payments were $12 to $15 per subject for sessions that lasted
about an hour.
Since payoffs are aggregated across all 20 rounds in each treatment to deter-
mine payments, I shall discuss the model’s parameters in terms of the these totals.
In both cases the market capacity is fixed to c = 11 and the payoff magnitudes
91
Chapter 2. Noisy best response and scale illusion in the market entry game
are vi = 4 for every player i. In the free treatment, the reservation wage and the
fixed wage to entry are equal and normalized for simplicity to a = r = 0. The toll
is then defined as a reduction of the fixed wage to entry to a = −24. As stated
above, this is equivalent to maintaining a = r = 0 while reducing the market
capacity to the socially optimal level of c = 5.
In the first treatment where entry is free, the set of pure-strategy Nash equilib-
ria includes any combination of eleven entrants. Given a group-size of eighteen, the
underlying rate of entry should be 0.611. However, perfect coordination on a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium is especially difficult in this environment, where some
players must enter while others must stay out. The only symmetric equilibrium is
a mixed-strategy with an underlying entry rate of 0.589. Taking all asymmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria into consideration as well, the observed average rate of
entry may vary from 0.556 to 0.611. Thus, the introduction of mixed-strategies
should, in theory, allow for average entry rates below the pure-strategy level.
The same is true in the second treatment. If the toll reduces the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium number of entrants to five, then one would expect an average
entry rate of 0.278. Supposing that the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium is
focal, the average entry rate drops to 0.235. The full range of equilibria, including
the asymmetric mixed-strategies, yields an average entry rate varying from 0.222
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to 0.278. In both cases, the average entry rate under pure strategies represents
an upper bound (see Theorem 3 in appendix A).
Table 2.1: Experiment I: Average Entry by Treatment
Group Free Toll
1 0.594
(0.116)
0.325∗∗
(0.110)
2 0.617
(0.115)
0.311
(0.109)
3 0.550
(0.117)
0.308
(0.109)
4 0.606
(0.115)
0.286
(0.107)
5 0.614
(0.115)
0.317
(0.110)
6 0.628
(0.114)
0.322∗∗
(0.110)
7 0.603
(0.115)
0.317
(0.110)
8 0.603
(0.115)
0.333∗∗
(0.111)
9 0.635
(0.117)
0.329
(0.114)
10 0.631
(0.114)
0.306
(0.109)
All 0.608
(0.036)
0.315∗∗
(0.035)
Table 2.1 presents the estimated average entry rates observed in this exper-
iment. The results are presented for each session, as well as the whole dataset.
Column two corresponds to free entry, with a capacity of eleven, while column
three represents the toll for entry, in which the capacity is tacitly reduced to five.
The null hypothesis tested in this table is that the average entry rate is equal to
its upper-bound, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium rate. The estimated entry rates
never differ significantly from the Nash prediction in the free treatment. Surpris-
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ingly, estimates vary significantly from the pure-strategy Nash prediction in the
toll treatment. The pure-strategy prediction is an upper-bound, and introducing
mixed-strategies only lowers the expected entry rate.
This could be explained using disequilibrium. For example, suppose each
subject believes her group has coordinated upon an equilibrium in which she
may enter with certainty. Then the experimenter should expect an entry rate of
one, well above any Nash prediction. However, such an explanation is undercut
by learning. In this baseline experiment, subjects are in fixed groupings, and they
are able to observe the total number of entrants after each round. There is no
evidence of such costly errors being sustained across rounds.
However, there is little evidence of convergence either. Almost half of all
subjects switch their choice in the subsequent round after an equilibrium has
been reached, implying little hope for eventual convergence to a pure-strategy
equilibrium. If learning lead to convergence on a Nash equilibrium, the average
entry rate should trend across rounds towards the range of rates predicted by
the pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria. The data admit a stable and consistent
degree of noisy which is centered about the capacity for the free case, but it is
biased above the predicted entry rates in the toll case. Figure 2.1 shows that
the majority of individuals behaved “as if” they were mixing. There appears to
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be significant heterogeneity in entry rates. With only twenty observations per
individual, it is unclear how much of the supposed heterogeneity is simply noise.
Figure 2.1: Individual Entry Rates
One natural explanation for the lack of convergence is bounded rationality.
Players are able to correctly perceive their incentives, however, they remain un-
certain about the actions of others. In a boundedly rational equilibrium, where
action uncertainty is left partially unresolved, players would never be able to settle
on a pure-strategy equilibrium. The logit form of the QRE is especially well-suited
to this task. Starting from λ = 0, the entry rate will always be 50%, and the lim-
iting logit equilibrium will be the symmetric, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Since the symmetric equilibrium is above 50% in the free case and below 50%
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in the toll case, this form of bounded rationality will predict under entry in the
former treatment and over-entry in the latter.
Estimating the logit parameter for the entire dataset, with only one degree of
freedom across both treatments, I find a sensitivity estimate of λˆ = 0.175, with a
standard error of 0.02. The corresponding entry rate for the free entry treatment
is 0.566, which is it a little below the estimates found in the experiment. However,
it is greater than the estimated rate for session 3, and it is not significantly differ-
ent from the average rate of 0.608 across all sessions. Likewise, the corresponding
entry rate for the toll entry treatment is 0.302. Unsurprisingly, this is not signifi-
cantly different from the overall rate of 0.315, which was significantly greater than
the pure-strategy upper-bound rate for Nash equilibria. Thus, QRE appears to
explain over-entry in the presence of a toll. While a small amount of under-entry
is potentially consistent with mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, fairness, altruism,
or efficiency, over-entry benefits neither the individual nor the group. Intuitively,
it is a pure example of a decision error.
2.3.2 Experiment II
The data presented here span eight experimental sessions. Four sessions in-
clude four groups of four subjects with a market capacity of three, and four ses-
sions include two groups of seven subjects with a market capacity of five. In
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each session, subjects participated in fifty rounds of play: ten practice rounds
and two sets of twenty potentially paid rounds; one for each information treat-
ment. Subjects’ types are distributed Bernoulli, with each player chosen to have
either a high stakes or low stakes with equal probability. These were re-drawn
i.i.d. for each round of the experiment. Under complete information, each subject
knows whether she is high or low, as well as the total number of high and low
players in her group. Under incomplete (private) information, each player knows
whether she is high or low, but only knows that everyone is high or low with equal
probability.
Table 2.2: Experiment II: Payoffs
Small Large
Entrants Low High Stay Out Low High Stay Out
0 - - 15 - - 15
1 25 35 15 25 35 15
2 20 25 15 22.5 30 15
3 15 15 15 20 25 15
4 10 5 - 17.5 20 15
5 - - - 15 15 15
6 - - - 12.5 10 15
7 - - - 10 5 -
The payoff structure to participants in this game is displayed in Table 2.2, and
the half of this table that corresponded to any session’s group-size was included
in the experimental instructions. The values were chosen so that the reservation
wage, which is the expected earnings for each subject if they coordinate, is equal to
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$15. Furthermore, I wanted to ensure that the minimum and maximum payments
were equal across group-size, for any given payoff type. Lastly, I wanted to ensure
that the minimum earnings were equal to $5, the minimum show-up fee in the
experiment. The set of Nash equilibria for this parameterization are presented
in Table 2.3. The principal branch of QRE is plotted in Figure 2.2 for the state
of nature with two low risk players. Notice that, under complete information,
increased responsiveness to payoffs actually increases the noisiness of low risk
players by pushing the entry rate towards 1/2. Thus, λ is a relative measure of
payoff responsiveness, not an absolute measure of noise.
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Table 2.3: Nash Equilibria
(a) Small
Nash Eqm nin nout p
Pure-Strategy 3 1 -
2 2 -
Symmetric Mixed-Strategy - - 2/3
Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy 1 0 1/2
(b) Large
Nash Eqm nin nout p
Pure-Strategy 5 2 -
4 3 -
Symmetric Mixed-Strategy - - 2/3
3 1 1/2
3 0 1/3
2 1 2/3
Asymetric Mixed-Strategies 2 0 1/2
1 1 3/4
1 0 3/5
0 1 4/5
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Figure 2.2: QRE: Principal Branch
At the group level, I find that the average entry rate, normalized by the market
capacity, is unaffected by group-size, information completeness, or experimental
rounds. Among the four sessions for each group-size, two encountered the com-
plete information treatment first, while two faced it second. There do not appear
to be any order or session affects. While the plots in Figure 2.3 are consistent
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with both noisy best response and mixed-strategy equilibria, they represent strong
evidence against pure-strategy equilibria. They unambiguously represent coordi-
nation failure in the strict sense.
Figure 2.3: Average Entry Relative to Capacity
Analysis Across States
Averaging across states of nature reveals a more nuanced story, as can be seen
in Table 2.4. I observe significant differences across player-type and states of na-
ture under complete information. High stakes players enter more often than low
stakes players, and this tendency moves in inverse relation to the total number of
high stakes players. Under incomplete information, I merely observe the overall
tendency for high stakes players to enter more often than low stakes players. As
can be seen in Table 2.5, all of these comparative statics are perfectly consistent
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with the predictions of logit QRE at the estimated value of the logit parameter,
regardless of whether this parameter is allowed to vary across experimental treat-
ments. This is because the choice probability to enter must be proportional to
the expected payoff of entry, which is greater for high risk players and may only
be conditioned on the full state of the world under complete information.
Table 2.4: Observed Entry Rates Across States
Small Small Small Small Large Large Large Large
State Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete
Realized Low High Low High Low High Low High
0 low types - 0.550
(0.056)
- 0.652
(0.05)
- 0.381
(0.109)
- 0.571
(0.202)
1 low types 0.567
(0.053)
0.511
(0.03)
0.541
(0.054)
0.592
(0.031)
0.889
(0.076)
0.519
(0.048)
0.667
(0.167)
0.648
(0.066)
2 low types 0.548
(0.033)
0.752
(0.029)
0.570
(0.032)
0.620
(0.031)
0.565
(0.074)
0.574
(0.046)
0.579
(0.057)
0.511
(0.036)
3 low types 0.548
(0.033)
0.763
(0.049)
0.559
(0.033)
0.635
(0.056)
0.58
(0.04)
0.505
(0.035)
0.601
(0.042)
0.587
(0.036)
4 low types 0.526
(0.058)
- 0.529
(0.061)
- 0.471
(0.042)
0.724
(0.044)
0.538
(0.044)
0.535
(0.05)
5 low types - - - - 0.550
(0.046)
0.646
(0.070)
0.592
(0.045)
0.688
(0.068)
6 low types - - - - 0.433
(0.092)
0.800
(0.200)
0.619
(0.076)
0.571
(0.202)
7 low types - - - - 0.143
(0.097)
- 0.571
(0.137)
-
Table 2.5: Predicted Entry Rates Across States
(a) One parameter total
Small Small Small Small Large Large Large Large
State Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete
Realized Low High Low High Low High Low High
0 low types - 0.596 - 0.610 - 0.577 - 0.610
1 low types 0.539 0.607 0.556 0.610 0.537 0.579 0.556 0.610
2 low types 0.546 0.626 0.556 0.610 0.538 0.607 0.556 0.610
3 low types 0.555 0.647 0.556 0.610 0.550 0.613 0.556 0.610
4 low types 0.566 - 0.556 - 0.553 0.619 0.556 0.610
5 low types - - - - 0.558 0.629 0.556 0.610
6 low types - - - - 0.547 0.600 0.556 0.610
7 low types - - - - 0.552 - 0.556 -
(b) One parameter per treatment
Small Small Small Small Large Large Large Large
State Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete Complete Complete Incomplete Incomplete
Realized Low High Low High Low High Low High
0 low types - 0.607 - 0.614 - 0.577 - 0.584
1 low types 0.537 0.628 0.558 0.614 0.537 0.579 0.542 0.584
2 low types 0.546 0.653 0.558 0.614 0.538 0.582 0.542 0.584
3 low types 0.559 0.692 0.558 0.614 0.540 0.586 0.542 0.584
4 low types 0.579 - 0.558 - 0.542 0.591 0.542 0.584
5 low types - - - - 0.545 0.595 0.542 0.584
6 low types - - - - 0.547 0.600 0.542 0.584
7 low types - - - - 0.550 - 0.542 -
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Analysis of Heterogeneity under Private Information
When information is incomplete, i.e. players only observe private information
regarding own payoff-type, but the ex-ante distribution of types is common knowl-
edge, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept allows for heterogeneity in entry rates
across any one player’s payoff type, which further implies heterogeneity across
individuals generally. However, this divergence must be robust to cursed beliefs,
which imposes a testable restriction upon the data.
The constraint concerns the relative entry rates of each individual across payoff
types. According to the parameterization used here, a mixed-strategy must satisfy
the following condition in order to be consistent with Bayes-Nash equilibrium (see
Theorem 4 in appendix A):
pil = α + βp
i
h where α =
1
q
· c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 and β = −
1− q
q
(2.15)
For a group-size of four, and equal probability of types, the parameters are: α ∈
{1, 4/3} and β = −1. These are testable restrictions on the data. I estimate a
number of restrictions on the full set of observations, as well as a restricted sample
that excludes those who entered or stayed out with certainty. Results are reported
in the Table 2.6.
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Table 2.6: Test of BNE restriction
(a) Small
Restriction Sample Size αˆ βˆ
None 64 0.538
(0.102)
0.045
(0.146)
α = 1 64 - −0.550
(0.074)
α = 4/3 64 - −1.000
(0.090)
Restricted Data 55 0.714
(0.099)
−0.343
(0.154)
Restricted Data & α = 1 55 - −0.741
(0.071)
Restricted Data & α = 4/3 55 - −1.204
(0.087)
With only one exception, the null hypothesis that β = −1 is rejected at the
5% level. The one exception is for the full data, with α = 4/3. In that particular
case, the estimate is spot on. Thus, I do not definitively reject the BNE mixed-
strategies. Nonetheless, in both specifications where α is a free parameter, I
strongly reject both that α = 1 or α = 4/3 and β = −1. Therefore, these
estimates present reasonable evidence that the mixed-strategies seen in the data
are not consistent with BNE. Therefore, players’ mixing rates are not consistent
with indifference or best-response behavior. The entry rates observed here give
rise to positive expected payoffs from entry; an opportunity that appears to be
under-exploited.
104
Chapter 2. Noisy best response and scale illusion in the market entry game
Analysis of Payoffs
This deviation from pure best response appears to be ex-ante welfare-improving.
Under pure strategy equilibria, everyone earns the reservation wage. In all of the
mixed-strategy equilibria, players are willing to mix because the ex-ante expected
payoff from entering is equal to the reservation wage; inducing indifference. Thus,
the only players who are predicted to earn more than the reservation wage are
those who enter with certainty, in an asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. By
contrast, QRE allows for the ex-ante expected payoff from entry to depend upon
payoff-type, state of nature, and the degree of noise. Table 2.7 reports the ob-
served average payoffs in excess of the reservation wage. Likewise, I report the
range of expected payoffs predicted by the asymmetric, mixed-strategy equilibria
and the QRE.
Table 2.7: Average Observed Benefit to Entry
Group-size Information Payoff-type All Data Restricted Mixed NE QRE
Small Complete Low 0.46∗∗∗
(0.12)
0.30∗∗
(0.12)
0.63 0.32-0.74
Small Complete High 2.07∗∗∗
(0.26)
1.90∗∗∗
(0.28)
1.25 1.06-2.24
Small Incomplete Low 0.65∗∗∗
(0.13)
0.50∗∗∗
(0.13)
0.63 0.67
Small Incomplete High 1.39∗∗∗
(0.27)
1.06∗∗∗
(0.27)
1.25 1.48
Large Complete Low 0.90∗∗∗
(0.10)
0.94∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.09-0.71 0.72-1.00
Large Complete High 2.03∗∗∗
(0.20)
2.09∗∗∗
(0.22)
0.17-1.43 1.63-2.21
Large Incomplete Low 0.72∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.65∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.09-0.71 0.84
Large Incomplete High 1.43∗∗∗
(0.22)
1.29∗∗∗
(0.23)
0.17-1.43 1.82
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Earnings are statistically significantly higher than the reservation wage across
all treatments. Yet, most subjects did not enter nor stay out with certainty.
This implies either (i) the absence of pure best-response behavior, (ii) players are
best-responding to mistaken beliefs, or (iii) some other criteria affects decision-
making beyond pure self-interest. The QRE predicts the average payoffs quite
well under complete information, as well as under incomplete information for
small groups. Meanwhile, the mixed-strategy equilibria predict better for large
groups with incomplete information.
Analysis Across Rounds
I previously decomposed the rates of entry across states of nature and payoff
types. Sample means were estimated across subjects as well as rounds. That
approach leads to multiple observations per subject because states and types are
often repeated across rounds. For example, a subject may find herself to be one
of three low payoff players in round 1 as well as in round 5 of a session. By
contrast, each subject may only make one choice per round, so a decomposition
across experimental rounds will only contain one choice per subject.
The plots in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 admit no trend in entry rates across rounds,
regardless of payoff-type, group-size, or information treatment. Thus, it would
appear that players do not improve at coordination over time. This is consistent
with the design of the experiment. Group matching is rotated each round, and
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outcomes are not revealed, so as to suppress the tacit coordination that might be
expected in a repeated game environment. To the extent that QRE is useful as a
descriptive model of during coordination failure, this is a desirable outcome.
Figure 2.4: Low Entry Rates
QRE predictions fall within one standard error of the estimated entry rates
with only rare exception. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the random
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draws of nature have a meaningful impact on overall predictions or outcomes.
Variation in states has only a slight effect on QRE predictions under complete
information, and, of course, no effect under incomplete information. Therefore, the
variation in estimated entry rates from round-to-round reflects statistical noise, as
there are only 40 subjects per treatment-round. This persistent noise is indicative
of the struggle to solve the underlying coordination problem.
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Figure 2.5: High Entry Rates
One concern with this data is whether or not players’ choices are indepen-
dent across rounds. Both QRE and BNE mixed-strategies assume that draws are
independent. The experiment is designed so that each round will function as a
single shot game. However, given the difficulty of the coordination problem, an
individual may play a heuristic that exhibits persistence across rounds. I exam-
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ine the average entry rates per round, in order to find any persistence that may
exist at the group level. So long as the group as a whole is making independent
draws, then either model presents a reasonable “as if” description of behavior at
the group level.
Table 2.8: Tests for Persistence
Group-size Information Auto-Low Auto-High Cross
Small Complete −0.081
(0.233)
0.173
(0.242)
−0.093
(0.188)
Small Incomplete 0.040
(0.275)
−0.047
(0.226)
0.181
(0.314)
Large Complete −0.243
(0.230)
−0.185
(0.238)
−0.094
(0.166)
Large Incomplete 0.185
(0.232)
0.207
(0.237)
0.034
(0.185)
I estimate an AR(1) model29 for the entry rates, averaged within a round, for
each payoff type in each treatment. It is clear from the results displayed in Table
2.8 that there is no persistence in entry rates at the group level. Likewise, there
is no cross-type correlation across rounds, i.e., if high payoff players enter at a
greater than average rate, this has no impact on the entry rates of low payoff
players. Thus, at the group level, individuals are not responding to their own
previous choices, nor are they responding the changes in the choices of others.
This suggests that models in which players randomize with independent draws
will be suitable approximations of the behavior observed in the laboratory.
29These regressions included a constant to absorb the positive mean in the data. I have
examined these data with an AR(2) model as well, and found no persistence in either case.
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Analysis Across Individuals
Upon close inspection of the data, there is an interaction effect between payoff
type and group-size. For small groups with complete information, high types enter
63% of rounds, while low types enter in 55% of rounds. However, with incomplete
information (private knowledge regarding one’s own type, common knowledge
regarding the ex-ante distribution of others’ types), high types enter 62% of the
time, while low types enter 56% of the time. In both cases, these differences are
significant at the 5% level. It bears repeating that the set of equilibria includes
asymmetric mixing, with some players choosing to enter or stay out with certainty.
For robustness, I collect a restricted estimate that excludes those subjects whose
entry rate was either 0% or 100%. Under this restriction, high types and low
types enter at a rate of 62% and 48%, respectively, for complete information and
58% and 49%, respectively, for incomplete information. Thus, the restriction only
strengthens the argument that payoff types matter for small groups.
By contrast, differences in entry rates disappear in both information treat-
ments with large groups, regardless of restrictions on the data. These results are
loosely consistent with QRE, which predicts a narrowing in differential rates of
entry among large groups. However, failing to reject a hypothesis is not the same
as accepting the alternative. Therefore, it is unclear whether there is no difference
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in entry rates with larger groups, or whether the sample size is simply too small
to effectively measure the smaller differences that may exist.
Looking at the individual level, however, I find a high degree of heterogeneity
in entry rates. The dispersion in entry across individuals is wider than anticipated
by either theory. It is not clear whether this variance is a rejection of both theories
or symptom of small sample size. Since each player’s type is re-drawn each round,
some subjects were only able to make a small number of decisions as a given type.
For example, some participants only made four decisions as a low type. In that
case, our estimate of that subject’s entry rate as a low type is predominantly
statistical noise. This may be why I observe entry rates of almost every decile
(10%, 20%, 30%, ...), for all player types and all treatments.
In support of the Nash concept, there also appear to be a number of subjects
who always entered or stayed out. To illustrate this fact, note that more than
20% of subjects always entered when low or high in the small-group, incomplete-
information treatment. However, only half of these subjects (roughly 10%) always
entered as both types. Given the entry rates predicted by QRE, we would reject
such an event, even at the 1% level. Yet, the only asymmetric mixed strategy with
small groups would require one out of four players to enter with certainty, which
is well above the level observed here. As is usually the case in experiments, there
remains much room for debate regarding individual behavior. It is possible that
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a subset of subjects were best responding to the belief that they had coordinated
on an asymmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium in which they should enter or stay
out with certainty.
Figure 2.6: Average Entry Rates
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It is possible to cut through much of this individual heterogeneity using proper
regression techniques. I estimate30 a fixed-effects linear probability model of entry:
Pi(si = 1) = αi + β ·Highi + εi (2.16)
The additional probability of entry by high payoff players is represented by β,
and I estimated a value for each treatment. In the simple model, I restricted
αi = α ∀ i. This is equivalent to the differences show in the bar graphs of Figure
2.6. I also estimate the fixed-effects model, allowing αi to pool by subject or
round. Pooling by subjects allows the model to absorb the large heterogeneity in
entry rates observed in Figure 2.7, while pooling across rounds controls for the
significant variation in entry across rounds found in Figures 3 and 4.
The results for the simple model, as well as both fixed-effects models are highly
robust. They strongly suggest that high types enter more often than low types,
when groups are small. However, this difference vanishes for large groups. This is
consistent with the entry differentials predicted by QRE. It is not obvious what
other models could re-produce this comparative static of coordination failure.
30These results are for the full data set. I have estimated these results, restricting attention
away from those who always enter or stay out, and have found similar results.
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Figure 2.7: Individual Entry Rates
2.4 Discussion
One central argument advanced in this research is that the rate of entry by
individuals will differ across payoff type. This stands in contrast to all of the Nash
equilibria under complete information, which predict no difference in entry rates
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across those individuals who are mixing. Likewise, Bayes-Nash equilibria allow
for different entry rates under incomplete information, but these equilibria imply
restrictions that are strongly rejected by the data. Subjects are not expected to
solve the equilibrium selection problem, so these discrepancies are presumably
characteristics of coordination failure. QRE predicts coordination failure, since
players are assumed to be noisy in their decision-making. Likewise, it predicts
differential rates of entry, since the probability each strategy is chosen is in some
proportion to the expected payoff. Therefore, this model is a reasonable alterna-
tive within this environment, where coordination failure limits the usefulness of
fully rational equilibrium concepts.
In their seminal work, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) argue in favor of a more
general interpretation of Quantal Response Equilibrium; namely, as a purely sta-
tistical model. While QRE is based upon a fixed-point argument, it may be
thought of as merely a tool for organizing data, similar to a regression model.
From this perspective, estimates of the precision parameter, λ, represent a rela-
tive measure of the degree of best response of subjects to the incentives of the
game. It is reasonable to remain agnostic regarding the remaining, unexplained
behavior. While the leading interpretation of this gap between random behavior
(uniform mixing) and pure best-response is bounded rationality, conceptually, it
is analogous to a statistical error term. Thus, a story of bounded rationality need
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not be mutually exclusive with alternative interpretations of coordination failure,
such as fairness or salience.
For example, one might imagine that the mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
each player enters with probability p = (c − 1)/(n − 1) is a focal point, since
it is the only symmetric equilibrium in this anti-coordination game.31 However,
the data presented here strongly reject this particular equilibrium. Alternatively,
one might imagine that it is only fair to allow high types to enter more often
than low types. After all, each subject is likely to have a turn to enter as a high
type in future rounds. This is similar to the notion of payoff-dominance. QRE
is perfectly consistent with either story, and the relative responsiveness of players
to the incentives will determine the size of such effects.
However, this analysis raises a critical question. Why bother calculating this
fixed-point, rather than simply estimating a conditional logit regression model of
the style introduced by McFadden (1974)? Both should be capable of reason-
ably organizing the data. Both assume individuals will enter in proportion to
expected payoffs. Both use the logit specification to transform expected payoffs
into choice probabilities. Both are statistical models that may be fit to the data
using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
31Anti-coordination games are generally associated with asymmetry, which is why they are
presumably harder to solve than standard coordination problems.
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The answer is that the regression approach ignores strategic interaction. Small
trembles by any individual affect the expected payoffs, and, hence, the choice
probabilities of every other player. This feeds back into the original trembler’s
expected payoff, affecting the degree to which she trembles, and, again, affecting
everyone else’s payoffs, etc. QRE is interesting because of the discipline imposed
by the fixed-point. Unlike a logit regression, QRE accounts for the feedback loop
of noisy behavior on beliefs; which is potentially quite serious in an environment
given the strong strategic inter-dependency of the coordination problem.
Table 2.9: Logit QRE versus Logit Regression
Fixed effect Fixed effect Logit Logit
Group-size Information Simple by Subject by Round QRE Regression
Small Complete 0.081∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.105∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.104 0.121
Small Incomplete 0.058∗∗
(0.028)
0.061∗∗
(0.025)
0.066∗∗
(0.028)
0.056 0.053
Large Complete 0.035
(0.030)
0.023
(0.027)
0.038
(0.031)
0.047 0.092
Large Incomplete −0.015
(0.030)
−0.012
(0.027)
−0.024
(0.030)
0.042 0.076
Does this reverberation effect across players actually matter when trying to
understand coordination failure in this game? The answer is clear: yes. As can be
seen in Table 2.9, the estimated regression model predicts a higher entry rate for
high types; however, it does not detect the attenuation of this effect as group-size
increases. That is because this effect is driven by the combination of noisy best-
response and strategic interaction, i.e. it is characteristic of the very strategic
uncertainty that leads to coordination failure in the first place (van Huyck et al.,
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1990). QRE gives economists a method for modeling of this strategic uncertainty
and its effects. It is a useful model for this reason; regardless of the interpretation
given to the departure from pure best-response.
2.5 Conclusion
There are natural extensions to this analysis. Experiment I presented toll
effects, which effectively lowered the fixed income to entry, a < r. Meanwhile,
experiment II varied the payoff magnitudes for individuals, vi. In more recent
work, Hartman (2010) has conducted an experiment including tolls (a < r) and
various payoff magnitudes (vi) simultaneously. The result is genuine preference
heterogeneity. In fact, the toll induces a reduction in entry among low payoff
types, allowing for sorting of high types onto the bridge. The fact that tolls solve
the coordination problem by sorting the highest types onto the bridge speaks to
its efficiency as a policy tool. It would be valuable to know how QRE would adjust
to such preference heterogeneity.
From an econometric perspective, I could also allow for heterogeneity in the
model by using heterogeneous QRE (Rogers et al., 2009). Allowing individuals
to have unique noise parameters vastly expands the degrees of freedom of both
QRE and the logit regression model, which may simple lead to over-fitting. That
being said, differences may emerge between the two methods that lead to further
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behavioral insights. For example, the estimated differences in the logit parameter
across treatments found here may reflect the attenuation bias that arises from
incorrectly specifying a homogeneous logit parameter (Golman, 2011). A recent
development by Bajari and Hortac¸su (2005) has lead to the estimation of HQRE
without having to solve for a fixed point (Camerer et al., 2011).
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Time preferences and the
management of coral reef fisheries
3.1 Introduction
Individuals’ time preferences (here discounting and present bias) have been ex-
tensively researched as they pertain to demographic characteristics and financial
decisions (Frederick et al., 2002). Recently, theories describing how individuals
conceive of decisions and tradeoffs have begun to be applied more expansively,
and research has considered the environmental implications of time preferences
(Hardisty and Weber, 2009). Much of the environmental research to date has
focused on how social discounting could influence policies for mitigating global
warming (Carson and Roth Tran, 2009). Less research has focused on the ma-
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rine realm, although notable exceptions include applications of time preference
concepts to marine protected area design (Grafton et al., 2005; Sanchirico et al.,
2006) and to ecosystem restoration (Sumaila, 2004). Research on the relation-
ship between the discount factors32 of individuals and the management of marine
resources is sparse.
Open access problems aside, we hypothesize that individuals with higher dis-
count factors and less present bias with regard to financial decisions (i.e., those
who value the future more highly) would also be more inclined towards resource
conservation (i.e., marine reserves and less damaging types of fishing gear). Con-
versely, one might expect that individuals with lower discount factors and more
present bias would be more inclined towards unsustainable levels of resource ex-
ploitation. Little empirical work has focused on this theory as pertains to fisheries
management. Substantially more research has addressed the risk preferences of
fishers (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Eggert and Lokina, 2007; Eggert and Mar-
tinsson, 2004; Eggert and Tveteras, 2004; Mistiaen and Strand, 2000; Opaluch
and Bockstael, 1984; Smith and Wilen, 2005) than the time preferences of fishers.
To our knowledge, only two published studies present fishers’ discount factors.
Both of those studies elicited individual discount factors (IDFs) using hypotheti-
cal choices between various fisheries management regimes and the theoretical fu-
32Throughout the paper, we refer to discount factors, not discount rates. For clarity, if ρ is
the discount rate and δ is the discount factor, the two are related by the equation δ = (1 +ρ)−1.
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ture income streams associated with those regimes (Akapalu, 2008; Curtis, 2002).
There do not appear to be any published studies presenting time preferences
elicited from SCUBA divers. Thus, the research presented here represents the
first attempt to elicit fishers’ and divers’ time preferences using incentivized exper-
iments (i.e., price lists associated with actual monetary payments), and further, to
explore the relationships between experimentally-measured discount factors and
stated resource management preferences.
We elicited time preferences from fishers and professional SCUBA divers on
Curac¸ao and Bonaire, islands in the southeastern Caribbean. Those professions
were targeted because both are financially dependent on the health of ocean re-
sources - fishers for the abundance of their catches, and professional divers for
attracting tourist clientele. These neighboring islands are former Dutch colonies
with similar histories of resource exploitation and similar marine ecosystems. The
time preference experiment was paired with a socioeconomic interview that in-
cluded questions on fishing and diving practices, perceptions of fish population
trends and coral reef health, and level of support for management options such
as gear restrictions and marine reserves. Here, we evaluate time preferences, as
well as demographic characteristics, to understand fishers’ and divers’ preferred
strategies for managing coral reefs.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Socioeconomic interviews
In fall of 2009 on Curac¸ao, and spring of 2010 on Bonaire, A.E.J. conducted
in-person interviews with (full and part-time) fishers and professional SCUBA
divers (i.e., dive instructors and divemasters). There are no records listing the
fishers or divers on either island, so stratified random sampling of these groups
was not possible. Instead, interviews were opportunistic, as exhaustive as possible,
and as inclusive as possible of all demographic groups. Interviewees were identi-
fied via recommendations from local contacts, approaching individuals at fishing
docks and in dive shops, and requesting the contact information for additional
individuals at the end of each interview in what is termed a snowball sampling
technique (Bernard, 1994). All divers were fluent or nearly fluent in English, and
a Papiamento-Dutch-English translator was used for all fisher interviews.
A total of 388 interviews were conducted: 126 fishers on Curac¸ao, 51 fishers on
Bonaire, 112 divers on Curac¸ao, and 99 divers on Bonaire. Based on the number
interviews, the number of potential interviewees identified but with whom it was
not possible to schedule interviews, and general knowledge of the fishing and
diving communities, we estimate there are approximately 200 fishers on Curac¸ao,
80 fishers on Bonaire, 120 professional divers on Curac¸ao, and 130 professional
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divers on Bonaire as of 2010. Based on these estimates, our sample represented
63% and 65% of the fishers on Curac¸ao and Bonaire respectively, and 86% and
83% of the divers on Curac¸ao and Bonaire respectively.
Of interviewees, eight fishers and five divers declined to participate in the
time preference experiment because they refused to have their participation in
the interview be at all associated with a monetary payment. Nine fishers and
eleven divers had multiple switch points in one or more price lists. Because such
responses imply either that this is an inappropriate approach for measuring IDFs
for those interviewees, or that they did not properly understand the questions,
those individuals are not included in this analysis. Five fishers did not provide
full demographic information. Thus, the responses of 153 fishers and 197 divers
are examined here.
3.2.2 Eliciting Time Preferences
Methods for eliciting time preferences have become well-honed, and the re-
search presented here utilizes the best techniques currently available in attempt
to capture the most accurate responses (Coller and WIlliams, 1999). Price lists,
sets of questions offering choices between receiving payments sooner and later,
accompanied by real monetary payments were used to elicit time preferences. At
the end of each socioeconomic interview, participants were asked twenty-one ques-
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tions - three price lists were used, each with seven questions (Appendix A). All
price lists presented choices between sooner, smaller payments, and later, larger
payments. Payments ranged from twenty to fifty florins (Fl.; 1 USD = Fl. 1.75).
This maximum payment of Fl. 50 was chosen because it is roughly equivalent to
a fisher or diver’s daily income, thus one would not expect participants to be in-
different between payment choices. Additionally, it is a denomination of the local
currency, so participants should have been familiar with its purchasing power, yet
the amount is not so high as to make the experiment cost prohibitive.
The quantities of money offered were consistent across price lists. All sooner
payments ranged from Fl. 50 down to Fl. 20, while all later payments were held
constant at Fl. 50. The sole difference among the price lists was the dates at which
payments were to be distributed. The first price list contained choices between
payments the upcoming Friday and payments two weeks from Friday. The second
price list contained choices between payments Friday and one month from Friday.
The third price list contained choices between payments two weeks from Friday
and a month from Friday. The experiment instructions and all questions were
read aloud to interviewees.
To encourage careful consideration of responses, each interviewee was offered
a cash payment in accordance with their answer to one of the twenty-one time
preference questions. After responding to all questions, participants pick a num-
126
Chapter 3. Time preferences and the management of coral reef fisheries
bered chip from a sack, and the quantity of their payment was determined based
on how they answered the question corresponding with the number on the chip.
For example, an interviewee who chose the chip marked with number seven, and
who in response to question seven chose to receive Fl. 50 two weeks from Friday
over Fl. 20 on Friday, would then actually be given Fl. 50 two weeks from Friday.
We employed front end delays (i.e., no payments were made at the time of inter-
view) to equate the transaction costs of choosing the sooner and later payments,
and to reduce the dependence of responses on level of trust for the researcher
(Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). All interviewees were required to retrieve their
payments at a specified future date, time, and location. On Curac¸ao, we dis-
tributed payments on Friday afternoons at Dienst Landbouw, Veeteelt & Visserij
(LVV), where the fisheries department is located. On Bonaire, we distributed
payments on Friday afternoons at the office of Stichting Nationale Parken (STI-
NAPA), the headquarters of the island’s marine park. Each interviewee was given
a card stating the date and time their payment could be picked up along with
directions to the payment distribution location.
3.2.3 Calculating discount factors and present bias
For the point in each price list where the participant switched from preferring
the sooner to preferring the later payment (i.e. the switch point), we took the mean
127
Chapter 3. Time preferences and the management of coral reef fisheries
between the sooner payment amounts in the question before the switch and in the
question where the switch was made. The mean is used, as is common practice,
because price list questions do not enable determination of the exact switch point,
rather the discrete range within which the switch occurs. We then divided that
mean by Fl. 50, the highest payment option in each question, yielding discount
factors from ≥ 1.0 down to 0.4 (Table 3.1). For example, a participant chooses
sooner payments over later payments in response to all price list questions until
asked to choose between Fl. 50 in two weeks from Friday and Fl. 20 on Friday,
and at that point chooses to wait two weeks to receive Fl. 50. He would have
a mean switch point of 25 (the mean of the Fl. 30 and Fl. 20 sooner payment
amounts between which the switch was made), which when divided by 50 yields
a discount factor of 0.5.
Table 3.1: Price list switch points with implied discount factors
Interviewee Midpoint between Discount # of fisher # of diver
Preference switch questions factor responses responses
50 later over 50 50 ≥ 1.0 31 58
50 sooner over 50 later 49 0.98 54 80
48 sooner over 50 later 46 0.92 10 16
44 sooner over 50 later 42 0.84 7 17
40 sooner over 50 later 37.5 0.75 20 13
35 sooner over 50 later 32.5 0.65 6 5
30 sooner over 50 later 25 0.5 7 6
20 sooner over 50 later 20 ≤ 0.4 24 10
A participant who chose later payments in response to all questions, even
when given the choice between Fl. 50 on Friday and Fl. 50 in 2 weeks, would
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have a discount factor of 50/50, which we notate as ≥ 1.0 because it cannot be
assigned an upper bound. A participant who chose sooner payments in response
to all questions would have a discount factor of 20/50, which we notate as ≤ 0.4
because it cannot be assigned a lower bound. These bounds cannot be determined
because the price lists did not include enough questions to determine switch points
for these participants.
We consider time preferences using a three period β − δ model:
Ui(c0, c1, c2) = ui(c0) + βδui(c1) + βδ
2ui(c2) (3.17)
In this model, β = 1 corresponds to the standard exponential discounting model,
while β 6= 1 represents hyperbolic time preferences (i.e., changes in discount rates
over time). Period zero refers to the upcoming Friday, while period one refers to
two weeks from Friday, and period two refers to four weeks from Friday. Individual
discount factors (IDF) were calculated based on participant responses to questions
in the three price lists: IDF1, IDF2, and IDF3 correspond with price lists one,
two, and three, respectively. Within this context, our elicited discount factors
relate to the model parameters as follows:
Discount Factors Model Parameters
IDF1 βδ
IDF2 βδ
2
IDF3 δ
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Within the β − δ framework, IDF3 yields the most direct measure of the
discount factor, δ, so we exclusively use IDF3 when analyzing the effect of discount
factors on management preferences. To examine the role of hyperbolic discounting,
individuals were categorized as present-biased, future-biased, or non-biased (pure
exponential) based on the definitions from the underlying model. Specifically, we
use the relationship between IDF1 and IDF3 to impute β, since these are the
IDFs calculated from price lists with two-week differences in payment dates, but
with IDF3 having an additional two-week front-end delay.
Time Preferences Value of β Relation to IDFs
Present-biased β < 1 IDF1 < IDF3
Exponential β = 1 IDF1 = IDF3
Future-biased β > 1 IDF1 > IDF3
Individuals for whom IDF1 was smaller than IDF3 are considered present-
biased, since this implies hyperbolic discounting, i.e., β < 1. Individuals for whom
IDF1 was larger than IDF3 are considered future-biased, i.e., β > 1. Individuals
for whom IDF1 is equal to IDF3 are considered non-biased, corresponding to the
standard model of exponential discounting.
3.2.4 Eliciting management preferences
As part of the larger interview, all participants were asked their opinions of
a variety of marine resource management options (see Appendix B). Questions
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were focused on fishing gear restrictions (i.e., requiring modifications to certain
types of fishing gear or banning gear types all together) and area restrictions (i.e.,
temporary or permanent no fishing or no diving reserves). Marine reserves, where
fishing is prohibited, are a scientifically proven way to increase fish populations,
restore habitat, and improve catches in surrounding areas (for Interdisciplinary
Studies of Coastal Oceans, 2007).
Using the nine gear questions and seven reserve questions, gear scores and
reserves scores were calculated for each individual based on the percentage of gear
restrictions and area restrictions they supported. Using responses to gear and
reserve questions and five additional miscellaneous management questions (i.e.,
restricting numbers of fishers and divers, and prohibitions on anchoring, catch
of certain species, and catch of juvenile fish), an overall conservation score was
calculated for each individual. The maximum value for each score is 100 (i.e., all
responses favoring restrictions on use and increased resource protection) and the
minimum value is zero.
3.2.5 Revealed management preferences
Questions on limiting the number of fishers and divers, closing areas to fishing
or diving, and restrictions on types of fishing gear are used to explore interviewees
willingness to have their own usage constrained, that is, their revealed manage-
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ment preferences. The most commonly used types of fishing gear on these is-
lands are hook-and-line, trolling, fish traps, spearguns, gill nets, and beach seines.
Hook-and-line and trolling generally cause less environmental harm (e.g., habitat
damage, bycatch of juveniles and non-target species) than do fish traps, spear-
guns, gills nets, and beach seines. Thus, we term the former low-impact gears,
and the latter high-impact gears. Low-impact gears have high risk of zero catch,
but also a chance of valuable catch; they tend to catch low numbers of high-value
species. High-impact gears have low risk of zero catch, are often less time inten-
sive per kilogram caught (traps and nets need not be constantly attended while
they are fishing), and have greater catch quantity, but with catch often (with the
notable exception of spearguns) comprised of lower-value species.
3.2.6 Data analysis
We conduct a variety of regressions in order to estimate the impact of time
preferences on attitudes towards management. Our model for each management
score (denoted Score) takes the form:
Score = α + φ1IDF3 + φ2IDF3 · Fisher + θ1Present+ θ2Present · Fisher
+θ3Present · Curacao+ θ4Present · Fisher · Curacao+ x′λ+ ε
(3.18)
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where IDF3 measures the exponential discount factor, δ; Present is a dummy
variable denoting present-biased time preferences, β < 1; Fisher is a dummy vari-
able denoting fishers; Curacao is a dummy variable denoting residents of Curac¸ao;
and x is a vector of demographic control variables. Within x are additional dummy
variables, several continuous variables, and a few controls for interactions between
variables. The dummy variables are for profession, location, marriage status, par-
enthood, possession of a bank account, access to credit, and employment status
(i.e., full-time, part-time, hobby). The continuous variables are for age, years of
experience, and a quadratic relation for the number of generations one’s family
has fished/dived. Lastly, to add more flexibility to the model, we also control for
interactions between profession and island, profession and marriage status, and
profession and possession of bank account.
We employ one large model to allow the effects of discount factors and present
bias to vary by group, and to avoid the loss of statistical power associated with
reductions in sample size. We denote the effect of IDF as φ1 for divers and φ1 +φ2
for fishers. Likewise, we denote the effect of present bias as θ1 for divers on Bonaire,
θ1+θ2 for fishers on Bonaire, θ1+θ3 for divers on Curac¸ao, and θ1+θ2+θ3+θ4 for
fishers on Curac¸ao. For robustness, we estimate a few alternative restrictions to
this flexible model, such as applying a uniform effect of discount factors (φ2 = 0)
or present bias (θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0) on management preferences, or allowing the
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effect of present bias to vary by profession (θ3 = θ4 = 0), island (θ2 = θ4 = 0), or
both (θ4 = 0). Under the full model, the effect of IDF varies by profession, while
present bias has four, independent effects for each profession-island pairing.
3.2.7 Risk-aversion
Any experiment involving time preferences must take care to address uncer-
tainty and risk aversion. Our use of a front-end delay for all payments controls for
changes in risk preferences within an individual due to the certainty of payments in
the current period versus the uncertainty of payments in future periods (Andreoni
and Sprenger, 2012). However, theory posits that a longer length to maturity of
any payment is inherently riskier, and the yield curve (i.e., the fact that interest
rates tend to rise with the length to maturity) is often cited as an example of this
effect. The future is deemed riskier because there is some increasing probability
that the payment will not be received. This reflects increasing riskiness of the
asset, not increasing risk aversion of the individual, over the length to maturity.
Recent research on U.S. treasuries (Startz and Tsang, 2012) suggests that the
majority of the yield curve is explained by pure hyperbolic discounting, not risk.
That is, what appears as an aversion to increasing risk over time-to-maturity is,
in fact, increasing impatience with longer waiting periods. Hence, it may be suf-
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ficient to control for present bias, which we do, without also controlling for risk
aversion.
Theory gives us further reason to believe that we have successfully identified
the effect of present bias in particular. While heterogeneous risk preferences may
affect observed discount factors (δ) and, hence, observed hyperbolic discount fac-
tors (β), it does not affect whether hyperbolic discounting is observed on the
extensive margin, that is, whether our dummy variable Present equals zero or
one. Additionally, the time to payment is quite short (four weeks at most), which
explains the large proportion of discount factors observed between 0.98 and 1,
and mitigates concern over payoff uncertainty. Thus, we are confident that our
results identify individual discount factors and hyperbolic discounting separately
from risk preferences.
3.3 Results and Discussion
3.3.1 Interviewee demographics
The mean age of interviewed fishers was 48.0 years, significantly older than
divers, for whom the mean age was 36.6 (p < 0.001, Table 3.2). Fishers were more
likely than divers to be married (p = 0.005) and to have children (p < 0.001).
Of married interviewees, divers were more likely than fishers to have an employed
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spouse (p < 0.001). Proportions of fishers and of divers who were married, had
children, and/or had an employed spouse did not differ significantly between is-
lands. Fishers had more years of personal experience and more generations of
family experience with fishing than divers had with diving (both p < 0.001).
Divers were significantly more financially secure than fishers, as measured by
their greater likelihood of having a bank account, a credit card, and a friend who
would loan them Fl. 50. (all p < 0.001). Of participants who could borrow Fl.
50 from a friend, fishers were significantly more likely to have to pay interest on
such a loan (p < 0.001). Professional divers frequently work in the dive industry
to temporarily support themselves while living abroad, tend to be more educated
than fishers, and often have higher-paying jobs they can return to and/or family
members (parents or spouses) to provide financial assistance while they pursue
professional diving. Mean annual incomes of interviewees were approximately
Fl. 22,100 ($12, 486 USD), and not significantly different between professions or
islands. However, because income data were self-reported and 125 interviewees
(35%) chose not to respond to this question, income data are not used further in
the present analysis to avoid potential effects such as sample selection bias.
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Table 3.2: Summary of demographic factors and management scores
Fishers Divers
Island Curac¸ao Bonaire Overall Curac¸ao Bonaire Overall
# of interviewees 109 44 153 106 91 197
Mean age 47.90
(1.23)
48.50
(2.89)
48.00
(1.20)
34.20
(0.89)
39.30
(1.31)
36.60
(0.79)
Years of experience 34.71
(1.24)
38.14
(2.74)
35.69
(1.19)
12.16
(0.83)
16.77
(1.18)
14.29
(0.72)
# of generations 3.14
(0.14)
3.41
(0.18)
3.22
(0.12)
1.34
(0.06)
1.37
(0.06)
1.36
(0.04)
Married 0.55
(0.05)
0.43
(0.08)
0.52
(0.04)
0.36
(0.05)
0.39
(0.05)
0.37
(0.03)
Children 0.80
(0.04)
0.71
(0.07)
0.77
(0.03)
0.26
(0.04)
0.26
(0.05)
0.26
(0.03)
Bank account 0.72
(0.04)
0.66
(0.07)
0.70
(0.04)
1.00
(0.00)
0.98
(0.02)
0.99
(0.01)
Credit card 0.50
(0.05)
0.41
(0.07)
0.48
(0.04)
0.66
(0.05)
0.70
(0.05)
0.68
(0.03)
IDF1 0.88
(0.02)
0.78
(0.03)
0.85
(0.02)
0.92
(0.01)
0.99
(0.02)
0.91
(0.01)
IDF2 0.83
(0.02)
0.69
(0.04)
0.79
(0.02)
0.90
(0.01)
0.89
(0.02)
0.90
(0.01)
IDF3 0.86
(0.02)
0.71
(0.04)
0.82
(0.02)
0.92
(0.01)
0.89
(0.02)
0.91
(0.01)
Present bias 0.16
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.13
(0.03)
0.12
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.11
(0.02)
Reserve Score 28.90
(3.36)
52.04
(4.12)
35.77
(2.80)
64.80
(2.17)
74.65
(2.17)
69.35
(1.57)
Gear Score 51.92
(1.87)
57.24
(3.91)
53.45
(1.75)
75.00
(1.98)
75.63
(2.52)
75.29
(1.57)
Conservation Score 44.28
(1.53)
52.87
(3.18)
46.75
(1.45)
71.36
(1.36)
74.44
(1.68)
72.78
(1.07)
To summarize the demographics, professional divers are generally younger,
unmarried, without children, white, foreign (mostly Dutch), and more financially
secure, with less personal and family history in their field than fishers. In contrast,
fishers are generally older, married, parents, black, Antillean, less financially se-
cure, and more experience. Diver demographics likely remain fairly consistent over
time despite high turnover within the professional diving community. Turnover of
fishers is low, although the proportion of time an individual allocates to fishing of-
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ten varies seasonally and inter-annually based upon the catch and the availability
of alternative employment opportunities.
3.3.2 Fisher and diver IDFs
The majority of fishers and divers appear to have relatively high discount
factors. However, fishers’ discount factors were significantly lower than those of
divers. Mean IDF3 for fishers was 0.82 (SE 0.019) compared to 0.91 (SE 0.011)
for divers (Table 3.2). Divers were significantly more likely than fishers to choose
the later payment even when the sooner and later payment amounts were both Fl.
50, which results in some IDFs of ≥ 1.0 (p < 0.05 for all price lists; Figure 3.1).
Fishers were significantly more likely than divers to choose the sooner payment
for all questions in a price list (p < 0.002 for all price lists). For fishers, IDF3
was positively correlated with having a bank account (p = 0.013). Counter to our
hypothesis, IDFs were not correlated with usage of high-impact gear.
Although evidence in the literature for the correlation between poverty and
time preferences is mixed (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008), some research has
identified a positive relationship between discount factor and income (Carson and
Roth Tran, 2009). Thus, the results here could reflect the fact that divers generally
have higher expected lifetime incomes than fishers, and a lower level of financial
constraint.
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Individuals largely offered similar responses across price lists. Fifteen percent
of fishers and 27% of divers had the same switch point in all three price lists.
Consistency in switch points could be caused by individuals not perceiving these
lists as presenting substantially different choices. Larger differences in days until
payment (time periods on the order of six months or a year) might have pro-
duced greater differentiation in responses between price lists, but could also have
exacerbated any effect of risk preferences.
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Figure 3.1: Distributions of individual discount factors
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3.3.3 Distribution of IDFs
The majority of both fishers and divers have discount factors ≥ 0.98, however,
the distribution of diver IDFs exhibits an essentially monotonic decline from 1.0
down to ≤ 0.4 for all price lists, while that of fishers has a somewhat tri-modal
distribution with additional peaks at 0.75, and at ≤ 0.4 (Figure 3.1). The cluster
of fishers at IDF ≤ 0.4 represents 9.7% of participants in the sample. This cluster
may be an artifact of the truncation of each price at the choice between Fl. 20
sooner and Fl. 50 later. If the range of sooner payments had included amounts
less than Fl. 20, some participants may have chosen additional lower payments,
resulting in discount factors lower than 0.4, thus dispersing that peak.
The cluster of fishers at an IDF of 0.75 represents approximately 10% of par-
ticipants. This concentration of responses, which corresponds with a preference of
Fl. 40 sooner over Fl. 50 later, but a preference of Fl. 50 later over Fl. 35 sooner
and, may be meaningful and not an artifact of the experimental design. Currency
quantities are often mentally compared against the value of oft purchased items,
offering a potential explanation for this peak. Polar, the most popular beer on
both islands, was priced from Fl. 36 to Fl. 38 per case at the time of this study,
and is one likely candidate for such a calibration. Although anecdotal and inad-
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equate to prove correlation, five fishers and one diver did explicitly mention this
as the rationale for their switch point.
3.3.4 Comparison with previous IDF studies
Despite the array of literature on measuring time preferences, and due in
part to widely varying elicitation methods, honing in on a “normal” range of
discount factors has been elusive. As compiled by Frederick et al. (2002), seven
studies published between 1978 and 2002 elicited discount factors using choice
sets associated with real monetary payments. Those studies produced a range
of annual discount factors from 0.0 to 1.01. The range of IDFs presented here,
from ≤ 0.4 to ≥ 1.0, is truncated due to the experimental design, hindering direct
comparison with previous research.
The two previous studies that report experimentally measured discount factors
of fishers found mean values substantially lower than those presented here. Fishers
in the Irish Sea had a mean discount factor of ∼0.7 (Curtis, 2002), and fishing
boat skippers in Ghana had a mean discount factor of 0.43 (Akapalu, 2008).
These studies measured IDF with questions about future profit scenarios that
would result from different fishery management approaches. Because those two
studies used different elicitation methods than the price list approach used here,
unfortunately it cannot be determined whether the higher discount factors we
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measured are indicative of important differences in cultural, economic, or fisheries
management contexts.
Another confounding factor when comparing discount rates is time period.
Broadly, there is the question of determining the appropriate time horizon for
considering the relationship of time preferences with ocean management decisions,
given that costs are often incurred in the near-term, while benefits accrue at an
unknown rate in the future. That said, we found sufficient variation in discount
factors within our two-to-four week time period to explain management prefer-
ences (Table 3.3). The weak incentives implied by a short time horizon should only
make significant results harder to find. Further, longer time periods to payment
increase the potential for participants to factor uncertainty of payment into their
decision-making, which could confound time preferences. Hence, we are satisfied
that the time period we used is sufficient to meaningfully explain management
preferences.
3.3.5 Present bias
Distributions of hyperbolic discounting were not significantly different between
professions or islands (Table 3.2). Contrary to our hypothesis, fishers who use
high-impact gear did not exhibit a higher incidence of present bias. Two-thirds of
both fishers and divers were non-biased. An additional 22% of participants were
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future-biased, and the remaining 12% were present-biased. As with IDF3 (Section
3.2), the relatively low occurrence of present bias may represent consistency across
price lists that individuals perceived as functionally equivalent. As for the large
proportion of individuals exhibiting future bias, perhaps individuals were using
the experimental payment as a commitment device for saving. For example, one
interviewee explained that although he did not currently have a girlfriend, he
might in two weeks, and if he waited for the payment then he would have money
to take her out to dinner.
Alternatively, motivation to wait for payment could be related to the highly
variable nature of fisher and diver incomes, with fishers depending on unpre-
dictable catches and divers depending partly on tips. Future bias could be related
to whether the interviewee had recently received a paycheck, whether divers had
recently received a good tip, and whether fishers recently had a good catch. In-
terviewees may also have been hesitant to admit a preference for receiving money
sooner, due to pride. This hesitation could have been exacerbated by the fact
that the participants were mostly male and the interviewer was a young female.
Indeed, decisions can be influenced by socio-cultural context, the desire to appear
competent, and the interview process itself, and therefore may not solely reflect
monetary preferences (Bowles, 1998; Levitt and List, 2007). Regardless, future
bias has no measurable impact on management scores for any of the functional
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forms we estimate. Thus, it is included within the reference category, along with
exponential discounting, in order to increase the statistical power of our measure-
ment of the effect of present bias.
3.3.6 Management scores
Mean gear scores, reserve scores, and conservation scores were significantly
higher for divers than for fishers (all p < 0.001, Table 3.2). This is not surprising,
since divers benefit from restrictions on fishing, while fishers bear the bulk of
costs for such restrictions. Without conditioning on any control variables, IDF3
(Table 3.3) is positively correlated with reserve scores (R1, p = 0.068), gear scores
(G1, p = 0.023), and conservation scores (C1, p = 0.003). This is consistent
with our hypothesis that more patient individuals would show greater support for
conservation efforts. Yet, when considering fishers and divers collectively, after
controlling for other relevant factors by estimating our model with a uniform
effect of discount factors and present bias, there are no significant relationships
between these scores and individual discount factors (R2, G2, C2).
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Table 3.3: Marginal effect of discount factors on management scores
Variable Restriction All Divers All Fishers
R1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 17.37
∗
(9.50)
17.37∗
(9.50)
Reserve R2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 7.09
(9.16)
7.09
(9.16)
Score R3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 25.30
∗∗∗
(9.39)
−6.31
(13.99)
R4: Full Model 24.81∗∗∗
(9.52)
−6.43
(14.17)
G1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 14.87
∗∗
(6.51)
14.87∗∗
(6.51)
Gear G2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 3.05
(6.55)
3.05
(6.55)
Score G3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 15.09
(11.84)
−5.82
(7.53)
G4: Full Model 15.09
(11.93)
−6.45
(7.57)
C1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 15.61
∗∗∗
(5.29)
15.61∗∗∗
(5.29)
Conservation C2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 4.06
(4.84)
4.06
(4.84)
Score C3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 18.30
∗∗
(7.26)
−6.43
(6.29)
C4: Full Model 18.05∗∗
(7.33)
−6.70
(6.33)
However, if we allow discount factors to have different effects for fishers and
divers, but present bias is still restricted to one overall effect, for fishers there is still
no effect, but we see that for divers (R3, G3, C3) discount factors are significant
in explaining reserve scores (p = 0.007) and conservation scores (p = 0.012),
though not gear scores. A 0.1 point increase in the discount factor leads to a
2.5 point increase in reserve scores for divers, or an almost 15 point increase
over the range of observed discount factors. Similarly, for conservation scores a
0.1 increase in the discount factor leads to a 1.8 point increase in conservation
scores for divers, or 10.8 points over the observed range. These results are robust
146
Chapter 3. Time preferences and the management of coral reef fisheries
to the restrictions we place on the effect of present bias (R4, G4, C4). Since
conservation scores are composed in part from reserve scores and gear scores, the
smaller effect of discount factors on conservation scores is expected. The lack of
an effect of discount factors on gear scores is also expected, since marine reserve
restrictions directly affect inter-temporal decision-making while gear restrictions
have only second-order inter-temporal effects (e.g., restricting high-impact gear
leads to improved future catches).
Table 3.4: Marginal effect of present bias on marine reserve scores
Bonaire Bonaire Curac¸ao Curac¸ao
Restriction Divers Fishers Divers Fishers
P1: φ1 = φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 −13.92∗∗∗
(5.26)
−13.92∗∗∗
(5.26)
−13.92∗∗∗
(5.26)
−13.92∗∗∗
(5.26)
P2: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 −7.43∗∗
(3.60)
−7.43∗∗
(3.60)
−7.43∗∗
(3.60)
−7.43∗∗
(3.60)
P3: θ3 = θ4 = 0 −5.55
(4.24)
−9.71
(6.06)
−5.55
(4.24)
−9.71
(6.06)
P4: θ2 = θ4 = 0 0.26
(5.52)
0.26
(5.52)
−10.73∗∗
(4.42)
−10.73∗∗
(4.42)
P5: θ4 = 0 0.63
(5.97)
−0.88
(7.46)
−9.91∗∗
(5.02)
−11.43∗
(6.18)
P6: Full Model −2.12
(6.69)
7.17
(8.02)
−7.93
(5.44)
−13.11∗
(6.77)
Present bias (Table 3.4) reduces marine reserve scores by almost 14 points (P1,
p = 0.068), 7.4 points (P2, p = 0.040) after controlling for demographic variables,
but does not significantly reduce gear scores or conservation scores. That is, in
support of our hypothesis, interviewees who were more present biased were less
supportive of marine reserves. Gear scores are not responsive to present bias,
thus washing out an effect for overall conservation scores, even after controlling
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for demographic variables. The effect of present bias on reserve scores is stronger
for fishers than divers (P3, 9.7 versus 5.5), though not significant for either, and
stronger on Curac¸ao than Bonaire (P4, 10.7 versus 0.26, p = 0.016). Model P5
estimates the effect of present bias across professions and islands simultaneously,
though the model assumes the difference between fishers and divers is the same
for each island. The estimates suggest a combined effect that is significant for
both fishers (p = 0.049) and divers (p = 0.065) on Curac¸ao; though present bias
appears irrelevant on Bonaire. The final model (P6), which estimates a unique
effect of present bias for each profession-island combination, suggests that present
bias only applies to fishers on Curac¸ao (p = 0.054). Given the relatively low sta-
tistical power of these estimates (four parameters with 40 observations of present
bias), it is not clear whether the effect applies only to Curac¸ao fishers, or whether
we lack the sample size required to parse the effect of present bias across profes-
sion and location at the same time. Perhaps these inter-island differences could
be explained by the greater industrialization and faster pace of life on Curac¸ao
relative to Bonaire (Wang et al., 2009).
3.3.7 Principal component analysis of management scores
The design of the management scores was carefully tailored to best measure
the conservation preferences of participants. That said, these key variables are
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constructed from survey responses; they are not naturally occurring and pas-
sively observable. This is true not only of conservation scores, which are compos-
ites of other created variables, but also, more subtly, of reserve scores and gear
scores. Therefore, as a robustness check, we conduct a principal component anal-
ysis (PCA) on the management scores and repeat our regression analysis using
the principal components as dependent variables.
We find that the effects of discount factors and present bias operate across
distinct principal components. This result indicates that IDF3 and Present are,
indeed, measuring distinct aspects of time preferences. The first principal compo-
nent is found to explain 76.9% of the variation across management scores, while
the second and third components explain 20.8% and 2.3% of the remaining vari-
ation, respectively. While the units of the principal components, themselves, are
not interpretable, the relative size of the estimated effects makes for useful com-
parisons.
The PCA results generally confirm our other findings. Only the first prin-
cipal component is significantly affected by discount factors (Table 3.5). When
allowing the effect of discount factors to vary across fishers and divers, we find
that discount factors only impact the conservation attitudes of divers (PCA-R3,
PCA-R4). In section 3.6, we showed discount factors impact both reserve scores
and conservation scores for divers. Therefore, it appears the measured effect for
149
Chapter 3. Time preferences and the management of coral reef fisheries
conservation scores merely represented the residual component of conservation
scores attributed to reserve scores.
Table 3.5: Marginal effect of discount factors on the principal components
Variable Restriction All Divers All Fishers
PCA-R1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 1.11
∗∗∗
(0.40)
1.11∗∗∗
(0.40)
Reserve PCA-R2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 0.31
(0.35)
0.31
(0.35)
Score PCA-R3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 1.31
∗∗
(0.53)
−0.43
(0.46)
PCA-R4: Full Model 1.30∗∗
(0.53)
−0.46
(0.46)
PCA-G1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 −0.02
(0.24)
−0.02
(0.24)
Gear PCA-G2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 0.08
(0.27)
0.08
(0.27)
Score PCA-G3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 0.16
(0.39)
0.02
(0.38)
PCA-G4: Full Model 0.15
(0.39)
0.03
(0.39)
PCA-C1: φ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 −0.05
(0.07)
−0.05
(0.07)
Conservation PCA-C2: φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 −0.01
(0.07)
−0.01
(0.07)
Score PCA-C3: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 −0.06
(0.10)
0.04
(0.11)
PCA-C4: Full Model −0.06
(0.10)
0.03
(0.11)
The third principal component is the only dimension significantly affected by
present bias (Table 3.6). Since the third component is the weakest, this explains
the difficulty in finding consistent results for the effect on reserve scores. By
isolating this component, we obtain stronger results for present bias. Varying
the effect of present bias by profession (PCA-P3), this component is reduced by
0.11 for divers (p = 0.028). Allowing the effect to differ across islands (PCA-
P4), we estimate the reduction to be 0.12 on Bonaire (p = 0.016) and 0.10 on
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Curac¸ao (p = 0.045). Allowing each profession-island to have a unique present
bias effect, we see that Curac¸ao fishers’ scores are reduced by 0.13 (p < 0.001).
Surprisingly, with PCA we find that Bonaire divers’ scores are reduced by 0.18
(p < 0.001), a far larger reduction than before. Thus, the PCA shows that
our previous estimates lacked the statistical power necessary to separate out the
effects of present bias on reserve scores across profession and island. We have
confirmed a strong positive effect of discount factors, and a significant negative
effect of present bias, on conservation attitudes. These effects are measured across
different principal components, so we are confident that the elicitation experiment
separately identifies these two dimensions of time preference.
Table 3.6: Marginal effect of present bias on the third principal component
Bonaire Bonaire Curac¸ao Curac¸ao
Restriction Divers Fishers Divers Fishers
PCA-P1: φ1 = φ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ = 0 −0.12∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.12∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.12∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.12∗∗∗
(0.01)
PCA-P2: θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0 −0.10∗∗
(0.04)
−0.10∗∗
(0.04)
−0.10∗∗
(0.04)
−0.10∗∗
(0.04)
PCA-P3: θ3 = θ4 = 0 −0.11∗∗
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.59)
−0.11∗∗
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.59)
PCA-P4: θ2 = θ4 = 0 −0.12∗∗
(0.05)
−0.12∗∗
(0.05)
−0.10∗∗
(0.05)
−0.10∗∗
(0.05)
PCA-P5: θ4 = 0 −0.13∗∗
(0.05)
−0.12
(0.09)
−0.10
(0.07)
−0.09
(0.06)
PCA-P6: Full Model −0.18∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.05
(0.10)
−0.06
(0.08)
−0.13∗∗
(0.06)
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3.3.8 Restricting their own resource use
We analyzed fishers’ and divers’ comparative willingness to put restrictions on
their own resource use. One percent of fishers were willing to limit the number
of fishers, whereas 34% of divers were willing to limit the number of divers (p <
0.001).33 Fishers who used high-impact gears (traps, spearguns, gill nets, seines)
had significantly lower marine reserve scores (p = 0.044), gear scores (p = 0.014),
and conservation scores (p = 0.037) than those who use low-impact gears (hook
and line, troll), reflecting reluctance not just on having restrictions placed on their
use of these gears, but on conservation measures in general.
Fishers were more likely than divers to support no diving areas and vice versa
for no fishing areas (both p < 0.001). Sixty-two percent of divers supported no
diving areas versus 37% of fishers who supported no fishing areas. On Bonaire,
the same relationship holds as regards the existing no fishing and no diving areas,
with fishers more likely than divers to support additional no diving areas (p =
0.035) and vice versa for no additional fishing areas (p = 0.008). Divers on
Bonaire were significantly more likely to support additional no diving areas (51%
support) than fishers were to support additional no fishing areas (32% support;
p < 0.05). Taken together, this is evidence of divers’ greater patience with resource
33A restriction on the number of divers is likely to restrict the number of tourist divers,
and thereby the number of potential customers, but not necessarily the number of professional
divers. A restriction on the number of fishers could directly prevent interviewees from fishing.
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use relative to fishers. To be fair, we are comparing a non-extractive, recent
profession dominated by foreigners (diving) with a resource extractive profession
with a long cultural history conducted by locals who feel displaced (fishing). There
are likely complex socio-cultural factors at play here. Regardless, divers focus on
observing marine life and therefore benefit from restrictions on fishing, so these
differences in observed management preferences are to be expected to some degree.
3.3.9 Key findings
Fishers and divers had relatively high discount factors; however, fishers’ IDFs
were significantly lower. The distribution of fishers’ IDFs is somewhat trimodal
(versus a monotonic decline for divers), perhaps related to the salient purchasing
power of particular dollar amounts. Interestingly, divers’ discount factors were
positively related to their view of marine reserves, though not with their views
of gear restrictions. Discount factors appear unrelated to management scores for
fishers.
Fishers who use high-impact gear did not exhibit the higher incidence of
present bias we had anticipated. However, as expected, interviewees who were
more present biased were less supportive of marine reserves, controlling for a host
of demographic and economic factors. An explanation for the high proportion of
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present-biased interviewees cannot be determined from our data, but could be due
to income variability or socio-cultural factors.
Divers are overall more supportive of management measures than fishers, and,
divers’ responses support our hypothesis that individuals who are more patient
with money are more likely to support marine reserves. Also as expected, fishers
who use high-impact gears are less supportive of marine reserves. Interestingly,
divers on Bonaire, where there is a long history of marine protection, were the
most supportive of conservation measures.
3.3.10 Policy implications
Fishers’ relatively lower levels of financial patience and support of management
measures that would contribute to long-term resource conservation has implica-
tions for the effectiveness of various policy approaches. Perhaps management of
fishing and diving should be approached differently, with consideration of these
inter-group differences in time preferences.
Our research suggests two options for applying our behavioral economic results
for increasing fishery sustainability. First, policy could attempt to shift fishers’
incentives towards conservation - perhaps with transfer payments to offset the
near-term expenses of switching to low-impact gears, reducing fishing effort, or
adding marine reserves. Since dive industry employees are more patient financially,
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have greater access to credit, exhibit higher valuations of conservation, and would
benefit from constraints on fishing, then perhaps they, or the dive industry more
broadly, could offset the costs of altering fishing behaviors. Such an offset may be
particularly needed because fishers who use high-impact gears are less supportive
of conservation measures (p = 0.037).
The notion of offsets is timely in the context of the dive fee that exists on
Bonaire and is being considered on Curac¸ao. Every individual who dives or
snorkels on Bonaire is required to buy an annual marine park tag for 25 USD, the
funds from which are used for marine park management. The idea for Curac¸ao is
similar; an annual fee would be used to fund enforcement of marine regulations.
Utilizing a portion of these funds to pay fishers to reduce or cease use of high-
impact gears could be a cost-effective conservation approach. For example, this
might be a mechanism for a buyout of the fish traps and nets that inflict dam-
age on shallow reef ecosystems, primarily catch herbivorous fish (i.e. parrotfish
and surgeonfish) critical for controlling algal growth, and are deeply disliked by
divers. Buyouts or other offsets, however, would require substantial community
buy-in and enforcement capacity.
Regarding community buy-in, there is an effect we call conservation inertia.
In addition to Bonaire having a dive fee, it also has no fishing and no diving areas,
whereas Curac¸ao has none of these. These differences seem to be associated with a
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dramatic inter-island difference in level of support for marine reserves. No fishing
areas receive 52% support on Curac¸ao versus 84% on Bonaire, and no diving areas
receive 32% support on Curac¸ao versus 94% on Bonaire (both p < 0.001). Perhaps
out of familiarity, people on Bonaire are more supportive of reserves, whereas
people on Curac¸ao may resist reserve establishment because the consequences are
unknown. Thus, gaining community support (especially from fishers) to put initial
conservation measures in place may be a challenge, but conservationist views may
grow after measures are put in place and benefits are seen.
Second, establishing property rights may not alone be sufficient for conserva-
tion. Ownership is presumed to lead to improved resource stewardship, and in
recent years fisheries economists have examined the potential for property rights-
based management approaches such as cooperatives, individual transferable quo-
tas (ITQs), and territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs). However, present
bias can lead to over-consumption of resources in the present despite the incen-
tive for sustainable use that is associated with ownership. For example, work by
Hepburn et al. (2010) demonstrates how mechanisms that align incentives with
resource-extraction externalities could still (though unlikely) leave the resource
stock susceptible to inadvertent collapse in the presence of hyperbolic discount-
ing. Therefore, even a property rights-based management scheme that addresses
the common-pool resource problem may need to be paired with additional mea-
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sures in order to prevent overfishing, if the fishers themselves are present-biased.
Interestingly, fishers who more greatly discount the future have been shown to be
more likely to violate fisheries regulations, especially if those regulations aren’t
perceived to be legitimate and the risk and severity of punishment are low (Aka-
palu, 2008).
This is not to say that management regimes involving property rights cannot
be effective. In fact there is much evidence that the sustainability of fisheries can
be improved by both individual transferable quotas (Costello et al., 2008) and
territorial use rights fisheries (White and Costello, 2011), given certain ecological
conditions and institutional structures. Thus, property rights should be imple-
mented within an overall framework for sustainably managing resource use. When
resource users are highly present-biased and financially constrained, the odds are
stacked against sustainable use. Thus, to lower the chances of overexploitation,
property rights could be paired with some mix of restrictions on effort and gears,
near-term incentives for sustainable use, strong enforcement, and robust commu-
nity buy-in. We suggest that future research into the most effective combinations
of management tools would be an important contribution to the field.
Ineffective management of coral reef fisheries can result in overfishing, over-
capitalization, and low profits (Munro and Scott, 1985), can facilitate a shift to an
algal-dominated ecological state (Hughes, 1994; Knowlton, 2004), and can jeopar-
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dize food security (Pauly, 2006; Sadovy, 2006). It is therefore critical for coral reef
management efforts and for fisheries research to consider how to address the myr-
iad factors that influence individuals’ resource use patterns, and apply economic
research when endeavoring to better align financial incentives with sustainabil-
ity. There is an important role for behavioral economics to play in developing
strategies to sustainably manage ocean resources.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has made use of behavioral models, experimental data, and
econometric techniques to gain a deeper understanding individual decision-making
in three public goods problems. In so doing, I am able to accurately predict many
useful comparative statics, as well as increase predictive power.
The first two chapters analyze the noisy behavior of subjects in two coordination/anti-
coordination problems. Standard tools are indeterminate in the threshold game
due to the multiplicity of equilibria, while treatment effects in the market entry
game are designed to be neutral. In both cases, treatment effects emerge that cry
out for an explanation. Given the noisiness of individual choices in these games,
and given the failure of group behavior to ever converge, quantal response equi-
librium represents a reasonable alternative. I find that structural estimates of the
precision parameter yield useful predictions across many treatment effects.
The third chapter uses a simple βδ-model to motivate the construction of
important variables in the data. Time preferences are elicited using a paid exper-
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iment, and demographic data is collected in the survey portion of the interview.
Controlling for key demographic factors, my co-author and I find that decreased
patience (lower δ) and present bias (β < 1) reduce willingness to use marine
reserves to conserve fisheries, but has no effect preferences for gear restrictions.
This is sensible because marine reserves represent a fundamentally inter-temporal
constraint on extraction, while gear restrictions are intended to mitigate a con-
temporaneous externality levied by fishers.
Various extensions lie ahead of this work. First, I would like to jointly estimate
a logit QRE and a warm-glow parameter. Second, I look forward to working
with John Hartman in integrating all three of our experiments, so that we may
examine the effects of preference hetereogeneity, not just payoff heterogeneity.
Such extensions certainly push the boundary of current computational feasibility.
This makes them challenging but, as yet, untapped lines of inquiry.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibria
The threshold game has highly discontinuous payoffs, which makes it in-
tractable on pencil and paper. This discontinuity is not incidental, it is a defining
feature of this environment. Below the threshold nothing happens. Above the
threshold, contributions are collected and benefits distributed in accordance with
the payoff structure. Assuming the threshold is reached, any purely self-interested
individual would hope to pledge as little as possible. Therefore, best response un-
der complete information occurs at the discontinuity in payoffs generated by the
threshold. Under incomplete information and with a discrete state space, there
may be several discontinuities in payoffs. This is because additional contributions
may lead to additional states of nature where the threshold is met.
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Figure A.1: Generic Payoff Functions
Figure A.1 plots a generic payoff function for both information treatments
above. As can be seen from both graphs, the best response occurs at a point
of discontinuity, where no first order condition holds. In order to calculate the
symmetric, pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria, I perform a simple grid search
across all potential contributions. I calculate the expected payoff function for
a generic low type and high type player, assuming the other n-1 players choose
(cl, ch). If the optimal contribution by the generic high type and low type players
both match the contributions of the other n-1 players, then I record that ordered
pair as an equilibrium, otherwise the results are discarded. Using the endowments
from the experiment, wi = 40, the grid search is for discrete values over (cl, ch) ∈
[0, 40]× [0, 40]. The results of this algorithm are available in Table 1.1 and plotted
in Figure A.2 below.
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Figure A.2: Sets of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria
To gain a deeper understanding of how this algorithm works, I will work out
a few numerical examples. I will use the 4-player game for simplicity. Suppose I
were to guess the solution
{(cl, ch)|2cl + 2ch = 80 & 13 ≤ cl ≤ 18.33} (A.1)
I will illustrate by verifying a point within this set, and rejecting a point on the
line that violates the restriction. Recall that each player’s payoff function will
have discontinuities at pivotal pledge levels where the public good is produced in
an additional state of nature. Expected payoff maximization requires comparing
the expected payoffs at these various points of discontinuity.
For example, suppose a generic player i is a low type, and all other players
choose the strategy (15, 25). Below is Table A.1 listing the contribution levels
required by player i to achieve the threshold in an additional state of nature, along
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with the expected payoffs. It is abundantly clear that player i’s best response is
to due her duty as a low type and choose c∗i = 15.
Table A.1: Comparing Expected Payoffs at Discontinuities
Contribution State State Payoff Expected Payoff
5 0Low/3High 15 1
8
[
20− 80
(
5
5+75
)]
= 1.875
1
8
[
20− 80
(
15
15+75
)]
15 1Low/2High 5 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
15
15+65
)]
= 2.708
1
8
[
20− 80
(
25
25+75
)]
25 2Low/1High -5 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
25
25+65
)]
+3
8
[
20− 80
(
25
25+55
)]
= −2.708
1
8
[
20− 80
(
35
35+75
)]
35 3Low/0High -15 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
35
35+65
)]
+3
8
[
20− 80
(
35
35+55
)]
1
8
[
20− 80
(
35
35+45
)]
= −9.723
The same will be true at every point in the set of equilibria. However, it is
important to note the second restriction in the guess above: 13 ≤ cl ≤ 18.33.
Suppose I attempt to verify that (10, 30) is not a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. I will
not consider the case of a generic high type, so the restriction may be equivalently
stated as 21.67 ≤ ch ≤ 27. Then the contribution levels that result in payoff
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discontinuities will change as well, as shown in Table A.2. It appears that a
generic high type would prefer to defect by only pledging 10.
Table A.2: Comparing Expected Payoffs at Discontinuities
Contribution State State Payoff Expected Payoff
0 0Low/3High 20 1
8
[
20− 80
(
0
0+90
)]
= 5.000
1
8
[
20− 80
(
10
10+90
)]
10 1Low/2High 10 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
10
10+70
)]
= 15.250
1
8
[
20− 80
(
30
30+90
)]
30 2Low/1High -10 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
30
30+70
)]
+3
8
[
20− 80
(
30
30+50
)]
= 12.250
1
8
[
20− 80
(
50
50+90
)]
50 3Low/0High -30 +3
8
[
20− 80
(
50
50+70
)]
+3
8
[
20− 80
(
50
50+50
)]
1
8
[
20− 80
(
50
50+30
)]
= 2.679
Identifying the exact location of these boundaries requires solving systems
of high order polynomials. In practice, this is only practical using numerical
methods, and the algorithms required are more computationally intensive than a
the simple guess-and-check grid search that I perform. I parse the space [0, 40]×
[0, 40] into steps of hundredths or thousandths. I then calculate the expected
payoff that any generic player i would experience at any given strategy in [0, 40]
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(also parsed into hundredths or thousandths) for both low and high payoff types.
Finally, I record the intersection of the sets of strategies (cl, ch) such that a generic
player i’s best response is to do as other low types when low and vice versa when
high. This exhaustive search reveals the sets of equilibria to any reasonable level
of numerical accuracy.
One apparent feature of these equilibria is that the maximum provision rate
is decreasing in group-size. For example, groups of four can achieve an average
provision rate of 86.75% while groups of eight could only achieve an average provi-
sion rate of 36.66%. Ramping up the algorithm to twenty and fifty players, I find
the effect is quite dramatic. For twenty players, the maximum average provision
rate is 13.16%, which is associated with seven or fewer low types. Meanwhile,
groups of fifty may only achieve an average provision rate of 0.08%, or no more
than sixteen low types. The dramatic drop in probabilities reflects the law of large
numbers as group-size grows.
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B.1 Theorems and Proofs
Theorem 1. Assume that nin and nout players deterministically choose to enter
or stay out of the market, respectively. Then there is a unique mixed-strategy
equilibrium where all remaining players choose to enter with the same probability:
p =
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 (B.1)
Proof. Define the remaining total number players, excluding an arbitrary player
i, as nj = n− nin − nout − 1, where each player chooses to enter with probability
pj, and define the total number of other mixing entrants as Sj =
∑nj
j=1 sj. Note
that player i will be willing to mix if and only if the average net gain to entry is
zero:
nj∑
Sj=1
nj∑
j=1
p
Sj
j
(
1− pj
)nj−Sj [a+ vi (c− nin − Sj − 1)]− r = 0 (B.2)
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Imposing the restriction (a = r) used in this experiment provides the preference
homogeneity that neutralizes any payoff magnitude effects:
nj∑
Sj=1
nj∑
j=1
p
Sj
j
(
1− pj
)nj−Sj (c− nin − Sj − 1) = 0 (B.3)
Notice that the term inside the parentheses may be separated as follows:
(c− nin − 1)
nj∑
Sj=1
nj∑
j=1
p
Sj
j
(
1− pj
)nj−Sj − nk∑
Sj=1
nj∑
j=1
p
Sj
j
(
1− pj
)nj−Sj Sj = 0 (B.4)
Within the first term, all of the summation collapses to unity, while in the second
term, the summation collapse into a standard expected value calculation:
(c− nin − 1)−
nj∑
j=1
pj = 0 (B.5)
Moving the second term to the right-hand-side yields the following equation:
c− nin − 1 =
nj∑
j=1
pj (B.6)
Since the left-hand-side is a constant, and the right-hand-side depends (via ex-
clusion) on player i, this statement will hold for each player i if and only if
pi = pj ∀ i, j:
njpj = c− nin − 1 (B.7)
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Dividing both sides by nj, and replacing this term with its definition nj = n −
nin − nout − 1, yields the familiar result from Rapoport et al. (1998):
p =
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 (B.8)
This is all quite trivial, since affine transformations of payoffs represent the same
preferences according to von-Neumann Morgenstern utility: Define preferences
by:
u˜i(si, s−i) =
 (c− S) if si = 10 if si = 0 (B.9)
In this experiment, each player’s payoff function may be written as the following
affine transformation of these preferences
ui = r + viu˜i (B.10)
As such, the set of Nash equilibria is identical to the homogeneous case solved in
Rapoport et al. (1998).
Theorem 2. Assume that nin and nout players deterministically choose to enter or
stay out of the market, respectively, regardless of payoff type. Define the remaining
total number players, excluding an arbitrary player i, as nj = n− nin − nout − 1,
where each player j with payoff type k chooses to enter with probability pkj , and de-
fine the total number of mixing entrants in state k as Skj =
∑nj
j=1 s
k
j . Then player
i will be ex-ante indifferent between entry and staying out if and only if expected
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payoffs match those found with Nash equilibrium under complete information. In
other words, the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria under private information is com-
posed of the set of Nash equilibria under complete information, as well as any
heterogeneous variation of these equilibria that is robust to cursed beliefs.
Proof. To begin, note that player i will be willing to mix if and only if the average
net gain to entry is zero:
K∑
k=1
nj∑
Skj=1
nj∑
j=1
qk
(
pkj
)Skj (
1− pkj
)nj−Skj
vi
(
c− nin − Skj − 1
)
= 0 (B.11)
Since the indexation of players is arbitrary, the above restriction must hold for
every player i who is mixing. Notice that the term inside the parentheses may be
separated as follows:
vi (c− nin − 1)
K∑
k=1
nj∑
Skj=1
nj∑
j=1
qk
(
pkj
)Skj (
1− pkj
)nj−Skj
−vi
K∑
k=1
nj∑
Skj=1
nj∑
j=1
qk
(
pkj
)Skj (
1− pkj
)nj−Skj
Skj = 0
(B.12)
Within the first term, all of the summation collapses to unity, while in the second
term, the summation collapse into a standard expected value calculation:
vi (c− nin − 1)− vi
K∑
k=1
nj∑
j=1
qkpkj = 0 (B.13)
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Moving the second term to the right-hand-side, and canceling the vi’s, yields the
following equation:
c− nin − 1 =
K∑
k=1
nj∑
j=1
qkpkj (B.14)
Since the qk’s are exogenous and the left-hand-side of this equation is constant,
and since the equilibria under complete information extend to private informa-
tion, expected payoffs are fixed to the levels under complete information, and
heterogeneity in entry probabilities is only permissible if it does not affect ex-
pected payoffs. Since these expected payoffs are associated with equilibria where
actions reveal nothing about payoff type, the extension to heterogeneity must also
be robust cursed beliefs.
Theorem 3. Assume payoff types are distributed Bernoulli, and that the proba-
bility of being a low type is denoted by q. Then the average entry rate implied by
the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria represent an upper-bound, i.e., the average
entry rate under pure strategies is at least as large as the average entry rate under
all mixed-strategy equilibria.
Proof. Start with the inequality implied by the theorem’s conclusion:
nin + (n− nin − nout) ·
[
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1
]
≤ c (B.15)
Note that the expression above may be re-arranged to the following:
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 ≤
c− nin
n− nin − nout (B.16)
180
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2
Cross-multiplying yields:
(n− nin − nout) (c− nin − 1) ≤ (c− nin) (n− nin − nout − 1) (B.17)
Distributing terms gives:
(c− nin) (n− nin − nout)−(n− nin − nout) ≤ (c− nin) (n− nin − nout)−(c− nin)
(B.18)
Canceling the first term on each side and dividing through yields the following
restriction:
c− nin
n− nin − nout ≤ 1 (B.19)
This is trivially true, given that the mixing rate is a probability:
0 <
c− nin − 1
n− nin − nout − 1 <
c− nin
n− nin − nout < 1 (B.20)
Theorem 4. Assume payoff types are distributed Bernoulli, and that the proba-
bility of being a low type is denoted by q. Then the following condition must hold
in any mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
nj∑
j=1
plj = α + β
nj∑
j=1
phj (B.21)
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Proof. From Theorem 2, the following relation must hold for any discrete type
space:
c− nin − 1 =
K∑
k=1
nj∑
j=1
qkpkj (B.22)
Therefore, with only two types the equation simplifies to:
c− nin − 1 = q
nj∑
j=1
plj + (1− q)
nj∑
j=1
phj (B.23)
Re-arranging terms, the result obtains:
nj∑
j=1
plj =
1
q
· (c− nin − 1)− 1− q
q
nj∑
j=1
phj (B.24)
The coefficients are determined by the exogenous parameters of the game:
α =
1
q
· (c− nin − 1) & β = −1− q
q
(B.25)
Given the design of this experiment, the parameters may take on the following
values:
α ∈
1,
4
3
,︸︷︷︸
Both
2
3
,
3
2
,
6
5
,
8
5︸ ︷︷ ︸
Large
 & β = 1 (B.26)
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C.1 Time preference experiment
Instructions:
This last part of the survey will only take a few minutes. For completing these
last few survey questions, you will receive up to fl. 50. All you have to do is choose
how you would like to be paid: sooner or later. There are 21 questions; each is
a choice between a sooner payment and a later payment. After you answer all of
the questions, you will draw a chip from this bag. The chips are numbered from 1
to 21 corresponding to the numbers of the questions. You will be paid according
to your choice in the question whose number is on the chip. For example, if you
choose the chip with the number 7 on it, you will receive the amount of money you
chose in response to question 7 on the date mentioned in that question. Payments
will be available for pick up on Fridays between 1pm and 5pm. I will personally
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be there to give you your payment. Would you like to participate in this part of
the interview?
Questions:
This Friday vs. 2 weeks from this Friday?
1. Would you like to receive fl. 50 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
2. Would you like to receive fl. 48 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
3. Would you like to receive fl. 44 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
4. Would you like to receive fl. 40 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
5. Would you like to receive fl. 35 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
6. Would you like to receive fl. 30 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
7. Would you like to receive fl. 20 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
This Friday vs. 4 weeks from this Friday?
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8. Would you like to receive fl. 50 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
9. Would you like to receive fl. 48 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
10. Would you like to receive fl. 44 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
11. Would you like to receive fl. 40 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
12. Would you like to receive fl. 35 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
13. Would you like to receive fl. 30 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
14. Would you like to receive fl. 20 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
Two weeks from Friday vs. 4 weeks from this Friday?
15. Would you like to receive fl. 50 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
16. Would you like to receive fl. 48 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
17. Would you like to receive fl. 44 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
185
Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 3
18. Would you like to receive fl. 40 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
19. Would you like to receive fl. 35 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
20. Would you like to receive fl. 30 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
10. Would you like to receive fl. 20 this coming Friday or fl. 50 2 weeks from
this coming Friday?
Do you have a bank account?
Do you have a credit card?
Do you have a friend who would loan you fl. 50?
How much interest would they charge you?
C.2 Survey questions about management of coral
reef resources
Gear Questions:
1. Should there be a limit to how small a mesh size can be on a trap?
2. Should rectangular holes be required in the side of fish traps to let small fish
escape?
3. Should there be a limit to how small the mesh size can be on a seine net?
4. Should there be a limit to how small the mesh size can be on a gill net?
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5. Should fishing with traps be banned?
6. Should snorkel fishing be banned?
7. Should fishing with seine nets be banned?
8. Should gill net fishing on reefs be banned?
9. Should gill net fishing be banned everywhere around the island?
Reserve Questions:
1. Do you support no fishing areas?
2. Do you think there should be more and/or larger no fishing areas?
3. Do you think there should be areas temporarily closed to fishing?
4. Should fishing on the reefs be banned?
5. Do you support no diving areas?
6. Do you think there should be more and/or larger diving areas?
7. Do you think there should be areas temporarily closed to diving?
Miscellaneous Management Questions:
1. Should there be a limit on the number of fishermen allowed to fish?
2. Should there be a limit to the number of divers allowed to dive?
3. Should catching juvenile fish be banned?
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4. Should uncontrolled anchoring be banned if the government provides more
buoys?
5. Are there any species you think should no longer be fished?
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